企业家选择的最优机制设计

研究了股东在缺乏企业家的实际业务能力、服务成本等方面信息的情况下，利用博弈论显示原理设计不同的报酬合同来让企业家选择，从而根据企业家选择结果来判断其真实的能力或类型，避免了企业家逆向选择与道德风险问题的发生．通过分析，得出了最优报酬机制是由努力补偿金、风险补偿金和信息租金三部分组成．最优报酬机制的灵敏度与期望补偿正相关，与固定补偿负相关．高效的企业家比低效企业家工作更加努力，更乐于选择高强度激励、低固定补偿的合同和选用风险较小的项目．

esign of Optimal Incentive Payment Scheme for Enterprisers

An optimal incentive payment scheme was designed in order to prevent the problems of enterprisers' adverse selection and moral hazard from occurring resulted from the absence of information on their real capability and their service cost and so forth. In this scheme, the revelation principle in the game theory is used to design different payment contracts to let enterprisers select, so a shareholder can judge their true information in terms of their selection. The analysis shows that the optimal payment scheme consists of compensation for their efforts, risk compensation and information rent, that the sensitivity of the optimal payment scheme is positively related to the expected compensation but negatively to the fixed compensation, and that efficient enterprisers work harder than inefficient ones and tend to choose high-powered incentives, lower fixed-price contracts and safer projects.