| 现行监督费率确定机制的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭汉丁,刘应宗,郝海.现行监督费率确定机制的博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2005,40(1):90-93. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭汉丁 刘应宗 郝海 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072;山西师范大学基建处,山西,临汾,041004
2. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 天津市建委资助项目(2001-软-7) |
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| 摘 要： | 应用委托代理理论分析政府管理部门与政府质量监督机构行为策略的博弈过程．基于对不同监督效率水平下监督成本的概率密度比例分析，调整监督政策与激励因素。设计有效激励机制，引导监督机构通过提高技术参数增强市场竞争能力．充分调动优良质量监督机构监督工作的能动性，优化监督市场资源配置，最大限度地实现建设工程质量的社会效益、环境效益和政府质量监督机构的经济效益目标．
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| 关 键 词： | 政府部门 质量监督机构 博弈 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 0258-2724(2005)01-0090-04 |
Game Analysis of Present System for Determination of Supervisory Prices in China |
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| GUO Han-ding.Game Analysis of Present System for Determination of Supervisory Prices in China[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2005,40(1):90-93. |
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| Authors: | GUO Han-ding |
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| Institution: | GUO Han-ding~ |
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| Abstract: | Game process for action tactics between the government and quality supervision organizations was analyzed with principal-agent theory. The analysis of the probabilities under different supervisory efficiencies suggests that the government needs to adjust the supervision policies and design effective incentive mechanism, guiding supervision organizations to strengthen their competitive powers by enhancing technical competence and realize the maximum social and environmental benefits for the government and economic returns for supervisory organizations. |
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| Keywords: | government departments quality supervision organizations game analysis incentive mechanism |
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