Modeling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge,road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects

Government guarantees are frequently used to attract private investors’ participation into Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects. In this paper, we investigate the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and road capacity by taking perspective of the private investor. The main results are: (1) Minimum traffic guarantee increases toll charge while decreasing road quality. Under a low guarantee level, minimum traffic guarantee has no impact on road capacity. However, it improves road capacity when a high guarantee level is performed. (2) Under minimum revenue guarantee, if the guarantee level is sufficiently high, the optimal toll charge will be sufficiently large, but road quality and road capacity will approach zero. (3) Price compensation guarantee decreases toll charge and increases both road quality and road capacity. This paper further investigates the impact of government guarantees when the contract is auctioned. We find that auction reduces the impact of government guarantees on toll charge while failing to affect the impact of government guarantees on road quality and capacity. Some policy implications are also derived from our model results.     

Optimal choice of capacity,toll and government guarantee for build-operate-transfer roads under asymmetric cost information

The private provision of public roads via the build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode has been increasingly used around the world. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of road capacity, toll and government guarantee, this paper investigates optimal concession contract design under both symmetric and asymmetric information about the marginal maintenance cost of private investors. Under asymmetric information, the government guarantee serves as an instrument to induce a private investor to reveal his true cost information. Compared with the situation under symmetric information, the government will suffer a loss of social welfare; the private investor will charge a higher toll that increases in his reported marginal maintenance cost, and specify a lower capacity that decreases with the reported cost. The results also show that the private investor obtains extra information rent beyond the reservation level of return and the rent decreases with his reported cost. However, the resulting volume-capacity ratios of the BOT road under both information structures are the same.     

Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

This paper identifies some implications of the cost of public funds (CF) in public transit subsidization and regulation. Regulation is considered because a monopolistic operator is assumed. A social welfare maximization model is proposed, subject to individual rationality and vehicle capacity constraints. Optimality conditions are provided and a key formula is derived about CF’s role in balancing the need to cover the fixed operation cost through fares on the operator’s side and the effort to maintain the user surplus on the passengers’ side. Major findings from this model’s formulation include: (1) CF determines the extent to which the passengers’ surplus is compromised in order to cover the fixed part of the operating cost, and (2) subsidy is unjustified when CF exceeds the critical shadow price of the financial constraint. Analytical relations are illustrated through numerical examples.     

Incentive subsidy scheme design with elastic transport demand

Huge public transport subsidies caused by deficits have become a heavy financial burden on some local governments due to the decline of bus passenger numbers. It is essential to apply the performance‐based contract to bus services considering maximization of social welfare. This paper constructs an incentive subsidy contract considering the decision‐making powers of the service level and calculating the proper frequency elasticity aiming at two problems of performance‐based contracts. Meanwhile, we consider a role of bus operators ignored by most researchers. Under the scheme, the decision‐making power of the service level is discussed based on five assumptions, and meanwhile, bus operators are motivated to reduce cost and improve service level in the scheme. The case of the bus service of Arao city indicates that the optimal frequency equals to zero when bus operators decide frequency. If bus operators determine efforts, the optimal effort also equals to zero with the goal of maximizing the profit. Also, bus operators can play their roles in lessening cost and improving service level to help bus operators and the local government achieve a win‐win situation, which maximizes the social benefit in this subsidy scheme when all factors are decided by the government. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach is one of the privatization mechanisms for promoting transportation infrastructure developments by using private funds to construct new infrastructure facilities. In a BOT scheme, it often involves three parties: the government, whose objective is to maximize the benefit defined in terms of social welfare added to the society; the private investors, whose objective is to maximize the profit generated from the investment; and the road users, whose objective is to minimize the inequality of benefit distribution among the road users traveling from different origin–destination pairs. Each of these parties has different objectives that often conflict with each other. In this paper, we develop various optimal road pricing models under demand uncertainty for analyzing the tradeoffs among the three objectives. In addition, a project evaluation framework is developed for assessing the effects of government policy and regulation on the BOT project. Seven cases of the BOT road pricing problem are analyzed: (1) BOT without regulation, (2) BOT with price control regulation, (3) BOT with equity regulation, (4) BOT with construction cost subsidy, (5) BOT with concession period extension, (6) BOT with construction cost subsidy and concession period extension, and (7) BOT with multiple objectives. Numerical results using a real case study of the Ban Pong–Kanchananburi Motorway (BMK) in Thailand are provided to examine the above seven cases.     

Integrating congestion pricing,transit subsidies and mode choice

We model and analyze optimal (welfare maximizing) prices and design of transport services in a bimodal context. Car congestion and transit design are simultaneously introduced and consumers choose based on the full price they perceive. The optimization variables are the congestion toll, the transit fare (and hence the level of subsidies) and transit frequency. We obtain six main results: (i) the optimal car-transit split is generally different from the total cost minimizing one; (ii) optimal congestion and transit price are interdependent and have an optimal frequency attached; (iii) the optimal money price difference together with the optimal frequency yield the optimal modal split; (iv) if this modal split is used in traditional stand-alone formulations – where each mode is priced independently–resulting congestion tolls and transit subsidies and fares are consistent with the optimal money price difference; (v) self-financing of the transport sector is feasible; and (vi) investment in car infrastructure induces an increase in generalized cost for all public transport users.     

Short-term impact analysis of fuel price policy change on travel demand in Malaysian cities

Abstract

Malaysia is one of the few countries in the world that provides a fuel subsidy to consumers. Due to the recent economic crisis, the Malaysian Government decided to revise its fuel subsidization policy from a fixed price subsidy to a floating price subsidy dependent on global oil demand. Recognizing that the change in fuel subsidization policy can have an impact on travel behavior, this article investigates the short-term impact of the policy change on private and public transportation in the Klang Valley region of Malaysia. Spectral analyses are performed to investigate if the policy change has an impact on private vehicle travel demand, measured in terms of road traffic, and short-term travel demand elasticity with respect to fuel price is estimated. To measure the impact on the public transportation system, the demand cross-elasticity values of rail transit and buses are also estimated. It was found that traffic flow reduces with an increase in fuel price, although elasticity and cross-elasticity values obtained are low. The article finds that there is a potential mode shift from private vehicles to rail transit with increasing fuel price. It is demonstrated that reducing fuel price subsidy can be an effective travel demand management strategy to alleviate congestion.     

Private road competition and equilibrium with traffic equilibrium constraints

Toll road competition is one of the important issues under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are two or more competing firms and each firm operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter-dependence in the network. In this paper we develop game-theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi-level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare-improving.     

Joint road toll pricing and capacity development in discrete transport network design problem

The paper demonstrates a method to determine road network improvements that also involve the use of a road toll charge, taking the perspective of the government or authority. A general discrete network design problem with a road toll pricing scheme, to minimize the total travel time under a budget constraint, is proposed. This approach is taken in order to determine the appropriate level of road toll pricing whilst simultaneously addressing the need for capacity. The proposed approach is formulated as a bi-level programming problem. The optimal road capacity improvement and toll level scheme is investigated with respect to the available budget levels and toll revenues.     

Congestion relief toll tunnels

Changing urban land-use patterns have reduced the importance of traditional downtowns as the origin and destination of numerous vehicular trips. Much traffic on downtown-area freeways seeks merely to get past downtown, thereby worsening the level of congestion for those seeking access to downtown.A number of European cities have begun to develop a new type of transportation facility: congestion-relief toll tunnels in downtown areas. These projects appear to be economically feasible largely or entirely from premium-price tolls paid by users. Hence, they are being developed by private consortia, operating under long-term franchises from government. Other keys to the feasibility of such projects are peak/off-peak pricing structures (congestion pricing), nonstop electronic toll collection, and restriction of use to auto-size vehicles only (to reduce tunnel dimensions and therefore capital investment).Preliminary analysis indicates that congestion-telief bypass runnels for downtown Los Angeles and San Francisco would be economically feasible as private business ventures, if developed along European lines. Similar approaches might be applied to other controversial freeway projects in both cities, and to restructuring Boston's huge and controversial Central Artery/Tunnel project.Congress has already authorized public-private partnerships of this type, permitting private capital and private owner/operation to be used, both for new projects and to rebuild existing highway, bridge, and tunnel facilities. Six states and Puerto Rico have enacted private-tollway legislation under which such projects could be developed and operated.This type of project should be politically feasible, since it offers a way to make significant transportation improvements in impacted downtowns with little or no public funding. While transit proponents may oppose the construction of toll tunnels, highway users are likely to support such projects, and some environmental groups may support this method of implementing congestion pricing in urban areas, because of its potential for reducing air emissions.     

Optimal bus fleet management strategy for emissions reduction

Transportation is a major cause for environmental degradation via exhaust emissions. For many transit-oriented metropolitan areas, bus trips often constitute a sizeable mode share. Managing the bus fleet, in particular updating buses to comply with the newer emissions standards, therefore, can have a substantial impact on transportation-induced air quality. This paper presents the approach of remaining life additional benefit–cost (RLABC) analysis for maximising the total net benefit by either early-retiring or retrofitting the current bus fleet within their lifespans. By referring to the net benefits for different bus types estimated by RLABC analysis, the most beneficial management scheme for the current bus fleet can be identified. Optimal bus fleet management (BFM) models based on the RLABC analysis for the operator and the government are developed. Then a government subsidy plan is produced to achieve win–win solutions, which will offer efficient and flexible management schemes. To illustrate the approach, the largest bus company in Hong Kong, which carries more than 23% of the total trips in Hong Kong, is taken as a case study example. Instead of adopting a fixed retirement plan, such as replacing buses at the age of 17 as is currently practised, the proposed method develops an optimal BFM scheme that progressively phases out buses or retrofits them. This study produces promising results to demonstrate the large benefit of this approach for optimal bus fleet management.     

Modelling route choice behaviour in a tolled road network with a time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium model

In this paper, we propose a novel approach to model route choice behaviour in a tolled road network with a bi-objective approach, assuming that all users have two objectives: (1) minimise travel time; and (2) minimise toll cost. We assume further that users have different preferences in the sense that for any given path with a specific toll, there is a limit on the time that an individual would be willing to spend. Different users can have different preferences represented by this indifference curve between toll and time. Time surplus is defined as the maximum time minus the actual time. Given a set of paths, the one with the highest (or least negative) time surplus will be the preferred path for the individual. This will result in a bi-objective equilibrium solution satisfying the time surplus maximisation bi-objective user equilibrium (TSmaxBUE) condition. That is, for each O–D pair, all individuals are travelling on the path with the highest time surplus value among all the efficient paths between this O–D pair.We show that the TSmaxBUE condition is a proper generalisation of user equilibrium with generalised cost function, and that it is equivalent to bi-objective user equilibrium. We also present a multi-user class version of the TSmaxBUE condition and demonstrate our concepts with illustrative examples.     

Active or passive? Sustainable manufacturing in the direct-channel green supply chain: A perspective of two types of green product designs

This paper considers a supply chain in which a manufacturer produces and sells two types of green products in its direct channel under government interventions aiming to improve social welfare. There is a Stackelberg game between the two stakeholders. Our research derives the closed form solutions to the optimal tax, green degree and price for the products, and obtains the strategies for government and manufacturer under different environmental policies. By considering six scenarios, our models obtain the best choice from the comparison between the two cases in which the manufacturer determines its product green degree actively or accepts the green standard set by the government passively. Then, we conduct some sensitivity analyses and explore the scenario in which there is competition between green products and non-green products. The results of this research indicate that the government setting the product green standard and providing the manufacturer with a subsidy is significant.     

Highway pricing and capacity choice in a road network under a build–operate–transfer scheme

It is often argued lately that the private sector should be allowed to build and operate roads in a transportation network at its own expense, in return it should receive the revenue from road toll charge within some years, and then these roads will be transferred to the government. This type of build–operate–transfer (B–O–T) projects is currently fashionable worldwide, especially for developing countries short of funds for road construction. One of the important issues concerning a highway B–O–T project is the selection of the capacity and toll charge of the new road and the evaluation of the relevant benefits to the private investor, the road users and the whole society under various market conditions. This paper deals with the selection and evaluation of a highway project under such a B–O–T scheme. For a given road network with elastic demand, mathematical models are proposed to investigate the feasibility of a candidate project and ascertain the optimal capacity and level of toll charge of the new highway. The response of road users to the new B–O–T project is explicitly considered. The characteristic of the problem is illustrated graphically with a numerical example.     

A new era for airport regulators through capacity investments

Private and public airports’ optimal actions may not coincide. While private airports usually pursue profit maximization, publicly owned airports look for maximum social welfare. Thus, the prices charged by private airports may differ from the socially optimal charges and public intervention may be needed. In this paper, we analyze airport charges when an increase in frequency produces positive or negative externalities and carriers have market power. We use the methodology of game theory to show that there may exist a level of capacity for which private and social objectives coincide, so no price regulation is needed. Thus, the usual role of regulators and planners could be modified in order to decide the appropriate capacity investments for which airport regulation is no longer necessary.     

Modeling intermodal equilibrium for bimodal transportation system design problems in a linear monocentric city

This paper investigates the intermodal equilibrium, road toll pricing, and bus system design issues in a congested highway corridor with two alternative modes - auto and bus - which share the same roadway along this corridor. On the basis of an in-depth analysis of the demand and supply sides of the bimodal transportation system, the mode choice equilibrium of travelers along the continuum corridor is first presented and formulated as an equivalent variational inequality problem. The solution properties of the bimodal continuum equilibrium formulation are analytically explored. Two models, which account for different infrastructure/system regulatory regimes (public and private), are then proposed. In the public regulatory model, the road toll location and charge level are simultaneously optimized together with the bus service fare and frequency. In the private regulatory model, the fare and frequency of bus services, which are operated by a profit-driven private operator, are optimized for exogenously given toll pricing schemes. Finally, an illustrative example is given to demonstrate the application of the proposed models. Sensitivity analysis of residential/household distribution along the corridor is carried out together with a comparison of four different toll pricing schemes (no toll, first best, distance based, and location based). Insightful findings are reported on the interrelationships among modal competition, market regulatory regimes, toll pricing schemes, and urban configurations as well as their implications in practice.     

A framework to evaluate policy options for supporting electric vehicles in urban freight transport

Electric vehicles (EVs) are considered as a feasible alternative to traditional vehicles. Few studies have addressed the impacts of policies supporting EVs in urban freight transport. To cast light on this topic, we established a framework combining an optimization model with economic analysis to determine the optimal behavior of an individual delivery service provider company and social impacts (e.g., externalities and welfare) in response to policies designed to support EVs, such as purchase subsidy, limited access (zone fee) to congestion/low-emission zones with exemptions for EVs, and vehicle taxes with exemptions for EVs. Numerical experiments showed that the zone fee can increase the company’s total logistics costs but improve the social welfare. It greatly reduced the external cost inside the congestion/low-emission zone with a high population, dense pollution, and heavy traffic. The vehicle taxes and subsidy were found to have the same influence on the company and society, although they have different effects with low tax/subsidy rates because their different effects on vehicle routing plans. Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis. Local factors at the company and city levels (e.g., types of vehicle and transport network) are also important to designing efficient policies for urban logistics that support EVs.     

Step-tolling with price-sensitive demand: Why more steps in the toll make the consumer better off

Most dynamic models of congestion pricing use fully time-variant tolls. However, in practice, tolls are uniform over the day, or at most have just a few steps. Such uniform and step tolls have received surprisingly little attention from the literature. Moreover, most models that do study them assume that demand is insensitive to the price. This seems an empirically questionable assumption that, as this paper finds, strongly affects the implications of step tolling for the consumer. In the bottleneck model, first-best tolling has no effect on the generalised price, and thus consumer surplus remains the same as without tolling. Conversely, under price-sensitive demand, step tolling increases the price, making the consumer worse off. The more steps the toll has, the closer it approximates the first-best toll, thereby increasing the welfare gain and making consumers better off. This indicates the importance for real-world tolls to have as many steps as possible: this not only raises welfare, but may also increase the political acceptability of the scheme by making consumers better off.     

Flexible-term contracts for road franchising

Private participation in road projects is increasing around the world. The most popular form of franchising is a concession contract, which allows a private firm to charge tolls to road users during a pre-determined period in order to recover investments. Concessionaires are usually selected through auctions at which candidates submit bids for tolls or payments to the government. This paper discusses how this mechanism does not generally yield optimal outcomes and it induces the frequent contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new franchising mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible-term contract and bi-dimensional bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism improves outcomes compared to fixed-term concessions, by eliminating traffic risk and promoting the selection of efficient concessionaires.     

Viability of new road infrastructure with heterogeneous users

This paper explores the importance of heterogeneity in value of time and route choice when assessing the viability of new road infrastructure to alleviate congestion problems. The model incorporates strategic interaction between road operators in a cost-benefit framework and several competitive regimes are considered. It is then employed to establish the financial and socio-economic viability of a congestion pricing demonstration entering Madrid city centre, where road users have to choose between a free but highly congested road and a priced free-flowing road (semi-private regime). A logit estimation is undertaken with information from a questionnaire among road users in the Eastern Madrid area to obtain users’ value of time and of congestion.The tolls obtained generate a traffic reallocation towards the new roadway such that revenues suffice to render the infrastructure socio-economically viable. The private and the low toll regimes generate similar welfare gains that are close to the first best. Yet the former supposes large losses to users. The low toll and the semi-private regimes do not raise such distributional concerns. However, the low toll regime requires a sufficiently high traffic growth rate to make it financially viable; this does not happen for the other competitive regimes.