Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach is one of the privatization mechanisms for promoting transportation infrastructure developments by using private funds to construct new infrastructure facilities. In a BOT scheme, it often involves three parties: the government, whose objective is to maximize the benefit defined in terms of social welfare added to the society; the private investors, whose objective is to maximize the profit generated from the investment; and the road users, whose objective is to minimize the inequality of benefit distribution among the road users traveling from different origin–destination pairs. Each of these parties has different objectives that often conflict with each other. In this paper, we develop various optimal road pricing models under demand uncertainty for analyzing the tradeoffs among the three objectives. In addition, a project evaluation framework is developed for assessing the effects of government policy and regulation on the BOT project. Seven cases of the BOT road pricing problem are analyzed: (1) BOT without regulation, (2) BOT with price control regulation, (3) BOT with equity regulation, (4) BOT with construction cost subsidy, (5) BOT with concession period extension, (6) BOT with construction cost subsidy and concession period extension, and (7) BOT with multiple objectives. Numerical results using a real case study of the Ban Pong–Kanchananburi Motorway (BMK) in Thailand are provided to examine the above seven cases.     

Incorporating uncertainty and risk in transportation investment decision-making

This paper presents a framework for addressing uncertainty and risk for large-scale transportation investments involving public–private participation. Demand, fare/toll and demand responsive costs are considered in the uncertainty analysis. Uncertainty analysis provides information on economic feasibility of the project. A set of relaxation policies is proposed to form various Ownership, Tenure and Governance (OTG) strategies reflecting the nature and level of participation by the public and private entity. A Monte Carlo Simulation-based Value at Risk is used to quantify risk. Finally, a methodology is proposed to integrate uncertainty and risk. The framework is tested on the proposed multibillion dollar Detroit River International Crossing connecting the cities of Detroit in the USA with Windsor in Canada. The analysis provides insights to probable outcomes for this transportation infrastructure investment under different OTG scenarios.     

Risk-Sharing in Seaport Terminal Concessions

Over the last two decades, infrastructure development has often been supported by public–private partnerships, particularly under concession arrangements. This paper addresses terminal concession contracts in the seaport sector, and especially the problem of risk-sharing. An effective allocation of risks is the base for the well functioning of the market, and for the success of the ‘landlord’ model. Under this model, the relationship between concessionaires and port authorities is fully dependent on a contract that should be in force for the period of the concession (20, 30 or more years). Based on several Portuguese concession contracts, this paper addresses the issue of risk-sharing agreements. Some policy implications are drawn, namely, alternative contract arrangements to decrease opportunistic behaviour by concessionaires, and to provide incentives to improve efficiency.     

Risk pricing inefficiency in public–private partnerships*

There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public–private partnership (PPP) rather than traditional public procurement. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests in the cost of financing and their efficiency in delivery and operation. This paper focuses on the cost of financing, in particular the cost associated with transferring risk from the public to private sphere. If capital markets were efficient and complete, the cost of public (government) and private financing should be the same, with the relative delivery and operational efficiency remaining as the primary determinant of value-for-money. Evidence suggests, however, that the risk transfer to a PPP entails an inefficient risk pricing premium which goes beyond the direct cost of financing. We argue that a high price for PPPs results from large risk transfers, risk treatment within the private sector, and uncertainty around the past and future performance of public–private consortia. The corollary is that the efficiency gains from a PPP must be much higher than commonly expected to deliver a greater value for the money than under a traditional approach.     

Integrated modeling framework for leasing urban roads: A case study of Fresno,California

Increasing private sector involvement in transportation services has significant implications for the management of road networks. This paper examines a concession model’s effects on a road network in the mid-sized city of Fresno, California. Using the existing transportation planning models of Fresno, we examine the effects of privatization on a number of typical system performance measures including total travel time and vehicle miles traveled (VMT), the possibility of including arterials, and the differences between social cost prices and profit maximizing prices. Some interesting insights emerge from our analysis: (1) roads cannot be considered as isolated elements in a concession model for a road network; (2) roads can function as complements at some levels of demand and become substitutes at other levels; (3) policy makers/officials should consider privatizing/pricing arterials along with privatizing highways; (4) temporally flexible but limited price schedule regulations should be part of leasing agreements; and (5) non-restricted pricing may actually worsen system performance, while limited pricing can raise enormous profits as well as improve system performance.     

Traffic forecasts under uncertainty and capacity constraints

Traffic forecasts provide essential input for the appraisal of transport investment projects. However, according to recent empirical evidence, long-term predictions are subject to high levels of uncertainty. This article quantifies uncertainty in traffic forecasts for the tolled motorway network in Spain. Uncertainty is quantified in the form of a confidence interval for the traffic forecast that includes both model uncertainty and input uncertainty. We apply a stochastic simulation process based on bootstrapping techniques. Furthermore, the article proposes a new methodology to account for capacity constraints in long-term traffic forecasts. Specifically, we suggest a dynamic model in which the speed of adjustment is related to the ratio between the actual traffic flow and the maximum capacity of the motorway. As an illustrative example, this methodology is applied to a specific public policy that consists of suppressing the toll on a certain motorway section before the concession expires.     

Private tollroads in urban areas

Governments of all persuasions are increasingly seeking the participation of the private sector in the supply of transport facilities and services. Private sector participation in the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure is considered a serious option in a number of countries in the search for ways of providing much needed investment which would otherwise be deferred. This paper considers some economic and financial problems in the private sector provision of major road infrastructure within urban areas. The main issues are attaching prices (i.e. tolls) to the provision of the service, the value of government rights which are being given up either permanently or temporarily, and the identification required by the promoters of the cost of capital which is essential information in establishing the risk. Broader environmental and equity issues are not addressed. If the approach to establishing a private presence in a previously public supply context is handled properly from the outset, the benefits can be significant. Contrarily however, the prospects could be quite undesirable if badly managed, despite the presence of an extended public purse.requests for offprints     

Timing rules for major transportation investments

The timing decision for major transportation investments – when to build – typically is made without an objective approach for considering the economic value of implementation at different times. This paper uses a model of benefit-cost analysis and derives rules for timing major transportation investments. Three sets of conditions are considered, depending on whether annual benefits of an investment are uncertain and whether the objective is to maximize net present value or simply to achieve positive net present value. The timing rules under each set of conditions are stated in three forms: benefit-cost ratio, annual benefits, and implementation time. The paper compares these timing rules analytically, discusses potential applications, and illustrates them with a numerical example. Consequences of incorrectly using the timing rules are also examined with the example. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Developments of CO2-emissions and costs for small electric and combustion engine vehicles in Germany

Electric vehicles have the potential to lower emissions in the mobility sector, but especially high costs might hinder their market development. This paper aims to access environmental and economic impacts and potentials by comparing CO₂-emissions and costs of small vehicles. Considering actual data it is analysed, if and under which conditions electric vehicles are financially competitive for private consumers and under which conditions emissions can be saved. For this, a multiple-stage approach is focusing on (1) emissions during production and operation, (2) private costs and (3) external costs of emissions. A model of total cost of ownership is applied for the analysis of private and external costs.Results show that emissions of electric vehicles exceed emissions of combustion engine vehicles in the production phase, but electric vehicles cause fewer emissions during operation. Total emissions can be saved by electric vehicles even with low annual driving distances (2500–5500 km/a today). Results highly depend on the form of electricity production.Today, private costs of electric vehicles exceed the costs of combustion engine vehicles. Due to cost decreases electric vehicles can gain financial advantages in the future. External costs are high, especially for combustion engine vehicles (up to 15% of private costs), but in none of the considered cases high enough to give electric vehicles a financial advantage today. This picture will change in the future.     

Valuation of strategic options in public–private partnerships

This paper investigates the feasibility of and develops an economic valuation model for strategic options in Comprehensive Development Agreements (CDAs). A CDA is a form of public–private partnership whereby the right to price and collect revenues from toll roads is leased to a private entity for a long but finite period of time. In exchange, this provides local and state governments with a quick influx of cash and/or additional infrastructure. Uncertainty associated with such long-term leases is of substantial public concern. This paper examines five different strategic options, namely a buyout option, a conditional buyout option, a revenue-sharing option, and two types of minimum revenue guarantee options. The buyout option in particular could give the public sector additional control over the future use of leased facilities and address potential concerns regarding long-run uncertainty and possible unforeseen windfalls for the private sector. The paper’s contributions include the analysis, feasibility assessment and valuation of several strategic options, sensitivity analysis of the solutions, an economic consumer demand-based revenue model for purposes of cash flow simulation, and analysis of option price sensitivity to “moneyness”. The main conclusion is that strategic options can provide useful risk reduction, but generally have significant value relative to the lease itself. By scaling down payoffs, options could be realistically included in CDAs and other PPPs. For some parameter values, option values to the developer and public authority are offsetting, allowing for costless risk reduction.     

Optimal choice of capacity,toll and government guarantee for build-operate-transfer roads under asymmetric cost information

The private provision of public roads via the build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode has been increasingly used around the world. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of road capacity, toll and government guarantee, this paper investigates optimal concession contract design under both symmetric and asymmetric information about the marginal maintenance cost of private investors. Under asymmetric information, the government guarantee serves as an instrument to induce a private investor to reveal his true cost information. Compared with the situation under symmetric information, the government will suffer a loss of social welfare; the private investor will charge a higher toll that increases in his reported marginal maintenance cost, and specify a lower capacity that decreases with the reported cost. The results also show that the private investor obtains extra information rent beyond the reservation level of return and the rent decreases with his reported cost. However, the resulting volume-capacity ratios of the BOT road under both information structures are the same.     

Optimal transit fare in a bimodal network under demand uncertainty and bounded rationality

This paper investigates the optimal transit fare in a simple bimodal transportation system that comprises public transport and private car. We consider two new factors: demand uncertainty and bounded rationality. With demand uncertainty, travelers are assumed to consider both the mean travel cost and travel cost variability in their mode choice decision. Under bounded rationality, travelers do not necessarily choose the travel mode of which perceived travel cost is absolutely lower than the one of the other mode. To determine the optimal transit fare, a bi‐level programming is proposed. The upper‐level objective function is to minimize the mean of total travel cost, whereas the lower‐level programming adopts the logit‐based model to describe users' mode choice behaviors. Then a heuristic algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach is designed to solve the bi‐level programming. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effect of demand uncertainty and bounded rationality on the modal share, optimal transit fare and system performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Simulation-based dynamic adjustments of prices and subsidies for transportation PPP projects based on stakeholders’ satisfaction

Transportation - Public–private partnership (PPP) has been well acknowledged by many as an innovative approach to the procurement of public projects. In their long-term concession periods,...     

Sizing parking facilities at airports

Established rules-of-thumb and industry guidelines for estimating the supply of parking at airports are based on uncertain quantities such as design year enplanements and number of airport employees, and are independent of cost. In the presence of continued uncertainty and increasing competition for limited space in and around airports, it is important that facilities are sized in relation to cost of providing and using them. A probabilistic model based on the classical “newsboy” problem is proposed to determine the optimal supply of parking in relation to expected total cost while treating demand as a random quantity. Empirical data are used to demonstrate the application of the proposed model for decision making. In addition to construction and maintenance costs, and user costs, decisions are shown to be sensitive to the level of uncertainty of design year enplanements.     

Does uncertainty make cost-benefit analyses pointless?

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is widely used in public decision making on infrastructure investments. However, the demand forecasts, cost estimates, benefit valuations and effect assessments that are conducted as part of CBAs are all subject to various degrees of uncertainty. The question is to what extent CBAs, given such uncertainties, are still useful as a way to prioritize between infrastructure investments, or put differently, how robust the policy conclusions of CBA are with respect to uncertainties. Using simulations based on real data on national infrastructure plans in Sweden and Norway, we study how investment selection and total realized benefits change when decisions are based on CBA assessments subject to several different types of uncertainty. Our results indicate that realized benefits and investment selection are surprisingly insensitive to all studied types of uncertainty, even for high levels of uncertainty. The two types of uncertainty that affect results the most are uncertainties about investment cost and transport demand. Provided that decisions are based on CBA outcomes, reducing uncertainty is still worthwhile, however, because of the huge sums at stake. Even moderate reductions of uncertainties about unit values, investment costs, future demand and project effects may increase the realized benefits infrastructure investment plans by tens or hundreds of million euros. We conclude that, despite the many types of uncertainties, CBA is able to fairly consistently separate the wheat from the chaff and hence contribute to substantially improved infrastructure decisions.     

An analysis of airport–airline vertical relationships with risk sharing contracts under asymmetric information structures

We analyze the double moral hazard problem at the joint venture type airport–airline vertical relationship, where two parties both contribute efforts to the joint venture but neither of them can see the other’s efforts. With the continuous-time stochastic dynamic programming model, we show that by the de-centralized utility maximizations of two parties under very strict conditions, i.e., optimal efforts’ cost being negligible and their risk averse parameters both asymptotically approaching to zero, the vertical contract could be agreed as the optimal sharing rule, which is the linear function of the final state with the slope being the product of their productivity difference and uncertainty (diffusion rate) level index.If both parties’ productivities are same, or the diffusion rate of the underlying process is unity, optimal linear sharing rule do not depend on the final state. If their conditions not dependent on final state are symmetric as well, then risk sharing disappears completely. In numerical examples, we illustrate the complex impact of uncertainty increase and end-of-period load factor improvement on the optimal sharing rule, and the relatively simple impact on total utility levels.     

Flexible-term contracts for road franchising

Private participation in road projects is increasing around the world. The most popular form of franchising is a concession contract, which allows a private firm to charge tolls to road users during a pre-determined period in order to recover investments. Concessionaires are usually selected through auctions at which candidates submit bids for tolls or payments to the government. This paper discusses how this mechanism does not generally yield optimal outcomes and it induces the frequent contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new franchising mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible-term contract and bi-dimensional bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism improves outcomes compared to fixed-term concessions, by eliminating traffic risk and promoting the selection of efficient concessionaires.     

Remuneration models and revenue risk mitigation in road public–private partnership projects – a case study from Serbia

As a consequence of renewed interest in attracting private financing for infrastructure investments, public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements are mostly seen as a suitable mechanism for ensuring sound and quicker delivery of transport infrastructure projects. However, a general concern is that expectations of mobilizing private-sector funds have been overestimated in a number of cases. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the risk analysis of transport PPP projects with substantial exogenous demand risk which could serve as a rationale for choosing the appropriate PPP model. The objective of this paper is to construct an analytical cash flow-based project model to facilitate the choice of the remuneration mechanism suitable for both private investors and public sector. The model provides an indication whether the project should be implemented as a ‘users pay’, a hybrid or an ‘annuity’ PPP model. The proposed methodology is illustrated using a case study from Serbia.     

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

Abstract

This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.     

A portfolio approach for optimal fleet replacement toward sustainable urban freight transportation

Recently, the use of more sustainable forms of transportation such as electric vehicles (EVs) for delivering goods and parcels to customers in urban areas has received more attention from urban planners and private stakeholders. To provide some insights toward the use of EVs, this work develops an optimization framework using portfolio theory, which takes into account the cost and the risks associated with some input parameter uncertainties, for determining an optimal combination of EVs with internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) in urban freight transportation (UFT) over some planning time period. This model can assist an urban freight operator to choose the best investment strategy for introducing new vehicles into its fleet while gaining economic benefits and having positive impacts on the urban environment. When taking into account the risks that are involved, the numerical results show that EVs have the potential to compete with ICEVs in UFT.