Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

On the relationship between airport pricing models

Airport pricing papers can be divided into two approaches. In the traditional approach the demand for airport services depends on airport charges and on congestion costs of both passengers and airlines; the airline market is not formally modeled. In the vertical-structure approach instead, airports provide an input for an airline oligopoly and it is the equilibrium of this downstream market which determines the airports’ demand. We prove, analytically, that the traditional approach to airport pricing is valid if air carriers have no market power, i.e. airlines are atomistic or they behave as price takers (perfect competition) and have constant marginal operational costs. When carriers have market power, this approach may result in a surplus measure that falls short of giving a true measure of social surplus. Furthermore, its use prescribes a traffic level that is, for given capacity, smaller than the socially optimal level. When carriers have market power and consequently both airports and airlines behave strategically, a vertical-structure approach appears a more reasonable approach to airport pricing issues.     

Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports

This paper investigates the effects of concession revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be affected by how airlines’ services are related to each other (complements, independent, or substitutes). In particular, when carriers provide strongly substitutable services to each other, the airport has incentive to charge airlines, rather than to pay airlines, a share of concession revenue. In these situations, while revenue sharing improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is further found that airport competition results in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had in the case of single airports. The airport–airline chains may nevertheless derive lower profits through the revenue-sharing rivalry, and the situation is similar to a Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the chains move further away from their joint profit maximum, welfare rises beyond the level achievable by single airports. The (equilibrium) revenue-sharing proportion at an airport is also shown to decrease in the number of its carriers, and to increase in the number of carriers at competing airports. Finally, the effects of a ‘pure’ sharing contract are compared to those of the two-part sharing contract. It is found that whether an airport is subject to competition is critical to the welfare consequences of alternative revenue sharing arrangements.     

Airport–Airline interaction: some food for thought

Abstract

We provide an interpretive analysis of vertical relations between airports and carriers, while assessing the way in which deregulation of the airline market and the privatization of airports have created incentives for airport–airline interaction. In particular, if the vertical structure approach has become the standard approach in air transport research, we add to the literature by discussing three issues that we believe need further understanding. The three issues that we think should be the focus of future research on airport–airline interaction are (i) incomplete contracts and asymmetric information structure; (ii) upstream horizontal complementarities; and (iii) airports as two-sided platforms.     

Serving vs. settling: What drives the establishment of low-cost carriers’ foreign bases?

This paper uses a probit model on a cross-sectional dataset of 202 airports and 29 airlines to assess the drivers for the establishment of foreign bases by European low-cost carriers (LCCs). We find that managerial, organizational, and environmental factors impact on foreign base establishment. In particular, there is evidence that the presence of a growth-oriented firm leader and the strategic importance of an airport for an airline significantly increase the probability of the presence of bases, while national unit labor costs, the volatility of flight operations and the membership of an LCC in an airline group significantly decrease this probability.     

Airline’s choice of aircraft size – Explanations and implications

When facing a growth in demand, airlines tend to respond more by means of increasing frequencies than by increasing aircraft size. At many of the world’s largest airports there are fewer than 100 passengers per air transport movement, although congestion and delays are growing. Furthermore, demand for air transport is predicted to continue growing but aircraft size is not. This paper aims to investigate and explain this phenomenon, the choice of relatively small aircraft. It seems that this choice is associated mainly with the benefits of high frequency service, the competitive environment in which airlines operate and the way airport capacity is allocated and priced. Regression analysis of over 500 routes in the US, Europe and Asia provides empirical evidence that the choice of aircraft size is mainly influenced by route characteristics (e.g. distance, level of demand and level of competition) and almost not at all by airport characteristics (e.g. number of runways and whether the airport is a hub or slot coordinated). We discuss the implications of this choice of aircraft size and suggest that some market imperfections exist in the airline industry leading airlines to offer excessive frequency on some routes and too low frequency on others.     

Apron capacity at hub airports—the impact of wave‐system structure

At hub airports, dominant airlines/alliance coordinate their flights in time with the aim of increasing the number (and quality) of connections, thus producing a wave‐system in traffic schedules. This paper addresses the impact of concentrating aircraft into waves on airport apron capacity. Existing models for apron capacity estimation are based on the number of stands, stand occupancy time, and demand structure, differing between representative groups of aircraft served at an airport. Criteria for aircraft grouping are aircraft type and/or airline and/or type of service (domestic, international, etc.). Modified deterministic analytical models proposed in this paper also take into account the wave‐system parameters, as well as runway capacity. They include the impact of these parameters on the number of flights in wave, stand occupancy time, and consequently apron capacity. Numerical examples illustrate the difference between apron capacity for an origin–destination airport and a hub airport, under the same conditions; utilization of the theoretical apron capacity at a hub airport, given the wave‐system structure; and utilization of the apron capacity at a hub airport when point‐to‐point traffic is allowed to use idle stands. Furthermore, the influence of different assignment strategies for aircraft stands in the case of hub airports is also discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modelling the resilience,friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event

This paper deals with developing a methodology for estimating the resilience, friability, and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event. The network consists of airports and airspace/air routes between them where airlines operate their flights. Resilience is considered as the ability of the network to neutralize the impacts of disruptive event(s). Friability implies reducing the network’s existing resilience due to removing particular nodes/airports and/or links/air routes, and consequently cancelling the affected airline flights. The costs imply additional expenses imposed on airports, airlines, and air passengers as the potentially most affected actors/stakeholders due to mitigating actions such as delaying, cancelling and rerouting particular affected flights. These actions aim at maintaining both the network’s resilience and safety at the acceptable level under given conditions.Large scale disruptive events, which can compromise the resilience and friability of a given air transport network, include bad weather, failures of particular (crucial) network components, the industrial actions of the air transport staff, natural disasters, terrorist threats/attacks and traffic incidents/accidents.The methodology is applied to the selected real-life case under given conditions. In addition, this methodology could be used for pre-selecting the location of airline hub airport(s), assessing the resilience of planned airline schedules and the prospective consequences, and designing mitigating measures before, during, and in the aftermath of a disruptive event. As such, it could, with slight modifications, be applied to transport networks operated by other transport modes.     

Reprint of “Modelling the resilience,friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event”

This paper deals with developing a methodology for estimating the resilience, friability, and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event. The network consists of airports and airspace/air routes between them where airlines operate their flights. Resilience is considered as the ability of the network to neutralize the impacts of disruptive event(s). Friability implies reducing the network’s existing resilience due to removing particular nodes/airports and/or links/air routes, and consequently cancelling the affected airline flights. The costs imply additional expenses imposed on airports, airlines, and air passengers as the potentially most affected actors/stakeholders due to mitigating actions such as delaying, cancelling and rerouting particular affected flights. These actions aim at maintaining both the network’s resilience and safety at the acceptable level under given conditions.Large scale disruptive events, which can compromise the resilience and friability of a given air transport network, include bad weather, failures of particular (crucial) network components, the industrial actions of the air transport staff, natural disasters, terrorist threats/attacks and traffic incidents/accidents.The methodology is applied to the selected real-life case under given conditions. In addition, this methodology could be used for pre-selecting the location of airline hub airport(s), assessing the resilience of planned airline schedules and the prospective consequences, and designing mitigating measures before, during, and in the aftermath of a disruptive event. As such, it could, with slight modifications, be applied to transport networks operated by other transport modes.     

Congestion spill effects of Heathrow and Frankfurt airports on connection traffic in European and Gulf hub airports

We develop two stage fixed-effects single-spill and double-spill models for congestion connection spills of London Heathrow and Frankfurt airports on 9 hub airports in Europe and the Gulf. Our panel data covers connection traffic from 1997 to 2013 for Heathrow and 1997 to 2011 for Frankfurt. The single-spill results support strongly that the connection spills from Heathrow’s capacity limitations do strengthen competing hub airports of major alliance groups and to a lesser degree one Gulf hub. The double-spill model for Heathrow and Frankfurt shows nearly asymmetric overall spill characteristics between the two airports. Our results underline the influence of airline network strategies on congestion spills as European airline networks are shaped by alliances and umbrella mergers. Thus, the airline network perspective in airport capacity expansion decisions needs to play a greater role, as indicated by our asymmetric results for overall spill effects between Heathrow and Frankfurt airports.     

Environmental charges in airline markets

Over the last two decades many airline markets have been deregulated, resulting in increased competition and use of different types of networks. At the same time there has been an intense discussion on environmental taxation of airline traffic. It is likely that an optimal environmental charge and the effects of a charge differ between different types of aviation markets. In this paper, we derive optimal flight (environmental) charges for different types of airline markets. The first type of market is a multiproduct monopoly airline operating either a point-to-point network or a hub-and-spoke network. The optimal charge is shown to be similar in construction to an optimal charge for a monopolist. We also compare the environmental impact of the two types of networks. Given no differences in marginal damages between airports we find that an airline will always choose the network with the highest environmental damages. The second type of market we investigate is a multiproduct duopoly, where two airlines compete in both passengers and flights. The formulation of the optimal charge is similar to the optimal charge of a single product oligopoly. However, we also show that it is, because of strategic effects, difficult to determine the effects of the charge on the number of flights.     

Multiple hub network and high-speed railway: Connectivity,gateway, and airport leakage

This paper considers the relation between the role of airport as gateway (inter–intra transit airport) and the connectivity between air transport and high-speed rail (HSR) transport to discuss the possibility of a multiple gateway system with HSR. We deal with both international and domestic transport markets in the model analysis. In the international markets, only airlines compete against each other, while in the domestic market airlines and HSR compete against each other. The results suggest that the improvement of connectivity between air and HSR at the airport increases its international passengers, and therefore, that strengthens its role as gateway, for example, gathering more inter–intra transit passengers. However, the results also suggest that the demand of the area which the airport belongs to affects the role of airport as gateway.     

Performance based clustering for benchmarking of US airports

Managing service operations is gaining significant attention in both academic and practitioner circles. In this broad area, performance evaluation and process improvement of airlines and air carriers has been the focus of several studies. Although efficient airport operations are critical for improved performance of airlines and air carriers, few studies have focused on airport performance measurement. This study evaluates the operational efficiencies of 44 major US airports across 5 years using multi-criteria non-parametric models. These efficiency scores are treated by a clustering method in identifying benchmarks for improving poorly performing airports. Efficiency measures are based on four resource input measures including airport operational costs, number of airport employees, gates and runways, and five output measures including operational revenue, passenger flow, commercial and general aviation movement, and total cargo transportation. The methodology presented here can be generalized to other industries and institutions.     

The time slot allocation problem under uncertain capacity

This paper presents two stochastic programming models for the allocation of time slots over a network of airports. The proposed models address three key issues. First, they provide an optimization tool to allocate time slots, which takes several operational aspects and airline preferences into account; second, they execute the process on a network of airports; and third they explicitly include uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first models for time slot allocation to consider both the stochastic nature of capacity reductions and the problem’s network structure. From a practical viewpoint, the proposed models provide important insights for the allocation of time slots. Specifically, they highlight the tradeoff between the schedule/request discrepancies, i.e., the time difference between allocated time slots and airline requests, and operational delays. Increasing schedule/request discrepancies enables a reduction in operational delays. Moreover, the models are computationally viable. A set of realistic test instances that consider the scheduling of four calendar days on different European airport networks has been solved within reasonable – for the application’s context – computation times. In one of our test instances, we were able to reduce the sum of schedule/request discrepancies and operational delays by up to 58%. This work provides slot coordinators with a valuable decision making tool, and it indicates that the proposed approach is very promising and may lead to relevant monetary savings for airlines and aircraft operators.     

Contract Design,Financing Arrangements and Public Ownership—An Assessment of the US Airport Governance Model

Abstract

US airports negotiate legally binding contracts with airlines and finance large investment projects with revenue bonds. Applying insights from transaction cost economics, we argue that the observed variation in contractual and financing arrangements at US airports corresponds to the parties' needs for safeguarding and coordination. The case evidence presented reveals that public owners set the framework for private investments and contracting. We suggest that airline contracts and capital market control result in comparative efficient investments and act as a check on the cost inefficiency typically linked to public ownership.     

Airport privatization in congested hub–spoke networks

This paper investigates the airport privatization issue. One congested hub and two linked local airports serve symmetric hub carriers. Passengers valuate the congestion delay cost and benefit from greater frequencies. The government considers privatizing either the hub or local airports. We find that in each privatizing scenario, welfare-maximizing public airport(s) set a charge below their operating costs in order to fully coordinate the high charge of privatized airport(s). If this fiscal deficit is not allowed, each scenario causes distortion. Interestingly, the distortion—and hence welfare losses—in privatizing a hub are smaller (larger) than those in privatizing both local airports when both passengers’ valuations are small (large); this is exactly the case when privatized local airports are strategic substitutes (complements). We also surprisingly find that retaining the hub airport as public and privatizing one or both local airports achieves the same market outcomes. We further find that if all airports are privatized, welfare becomes worse than the other scenarios; the hub airport charges lower (higher) prices than local airports when both local airports are strategic substitutes (complements).     

High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation: A vertical differentiation approach

This paper considers vertical differentiation between air transport and high-speed rail (HSR) with different ranges of travel distance to analyze the air-HSR competition effects on fares, traffic volumes and welfare, as well as the conditions under which air-HSR cooperation is welfare-enhancing. The analysis is conducted in a hub-and-spoke network with a network carrier, an HSR operator, and a spoke airline, taking into account potential hub airport capacity constraint. We find that air-HSR competition in the connecting market may result in the network airline charging an excessively high price in the HSR-inaccessible market. This effect is present even when the HSR-inaccessible route is a duopoly-airline market. On the other hand, air-HSR cooperation increases fares in the connecting market, and an improvement in rail speed or air-HSR connecting time reduces airfare on the routes where HSR and the airline compete. When the airline cannot serve all the markets due to limited hub airport capacity, it would withdraw from the market in which it has less competitive advantage over HSR. Finally, air-HSR cooperation is more likely to be welfare-improving when the hub airport is capacity constrained, and when either air transport or HSR exhibits strong economies of traffic density.     

Competition and deregulation: Do air passengers get the benefits?

It is well established that increased airline competition can produce benefits to passengers, and it is generally assumed that airport deregulation, as part of the same process of liberalisation, will produce similar benefits. But this paper shows that this may not be the case. The potential benefits to passengers from increased airline competition will in general be partially absorbed by increased airport charges at unregulated airports, and in some circumstances this may even result in increases in overall charges, not reductions. This problem is sometimes tackled by putting regulated price caps on aeronautical services, but if these are not extended to the complementary commercial services (such as retailing) which airports also provide then the adverse effects may still occur. Similarly, unilateral deregulation leading to increased airport competition in one country may just lead to the majority of the gains going abroad. Overall, the conclusion is that claims of big passenger gains from deregulation and competition may be exaggerated, and achieving these gains in reality may need subtle and quite far-reaching government intervention.     

Flight schedule punctuality control and management: a stochastic approach

The insufficiency of infrastructure capacity in an air transport system is usually blamed for poor punctuality performance when implementing flight schedules. However, investigations have revealed that ground operations of airlines have become the second major cause of flight delay at airports. A stochastic approach is used in this paper to model the operation of aircraft turnaround and the departure punctuality of a turnaround aircraft at an airport. The aircraft turnaround model is then used to investigate the punctuality problem of turnaround aircraft. Model results reveal that the departure punctuality of a turnaround aircraft is influenced by the length of scheduled turnaround time, the arrival punctuality of inbound aircraft as well as the operational efficiency of aircraft ground services. The aircraft turnaround model proposed is then employed to evaluate the endogenous schedule punctuality of two turnaround aircraft. Model results, when compared with observation data, show that the operational efficiency of aircraft ground services varies among turnarounds. Hence, it is recommended that the improvement of departure punctuality of turnaround aircraft may be achieved from two approaches: airline scheduling control and the management of operational efficiency of aircraft ground services.     

Airline-driven ground delay programs: A benefits assessment

Three decades of research studies in ground delay program (GDP) decision-making, and air traffic flow management in general, have produced several analytical models and decision support tools to design GDPs with minimum delay costs. Most of these models are centralized, i.e., the central authority almost completely decides the GDP design by optimizing certain centralized objectives. In this paper, we assess the benefits of an airline-driven decentralized approach for designing GDPs. The motivation for an airline-driven approach is the ability to incorporate the inherent differences between airlines when prioritizing, and responding to, different GDP designs. Such differences arise from the airlines’ diverse business objectives and operational characteristics. We develop an integrated platform for simulating flight operations during GDPs, an airline recovery module for mimicking the recovery actions of each individual airline under a GDP, and an algorithm for fast solution of the recovery problems to optimality. While some of the individual analytical components of our framework, model and algorithm share certain similarities with those used by previous researchers, to the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first comprehensive platform for simulating and optimizing airline operations under a GDP and is the most important technological contribution of this paper. Using this framework, we conduct detailed computational experiments based on actual schedule data at three of the busiest airports in the United States. We choose the recently developed Majority Judgment voting and grading method as our airline-driven decentralized approach for GDP design because of the superior theoretical and practical benefits afforded by this approach as shown by multiple recent studies. The results of our evaluation suggest that adopting this airline-driven approach in designing the GDPs consistently and significantly reduces airport-wide delay costs compared to the state-of-the-research centralized approaches. Moreover, the cost reduction benefits of the resultant airline-driven GDP designs are equitably distributed across different airlines.