Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.     

Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports

This paper investigates the effects of concession revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be affected by how airlines’ services are related to each other (complements, independent, or substitutes). In particular, when carriers provide strongly substitutable services to each other, the airport has incentive to charge airlines, rather than to pay airlines, a share of concession revenue. In these situations, while revenue sharing improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is further found that airport competition results in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had in the case of single airports. The airport–airline chains may nevertheless derive lower profits through the revenue-sharing rivalry, and the situation is similar to a Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the chains move further away from their joint profit maximum, welfare rises beyond the level achievable by single airports. The (equilibrium) revenue-sharing proportion at an airport is also shown to decrease in the number of its carriers, and to increase in the number of carriers at competing airports. Finally, the effects of a ‘pure’ sharing contract are compared to those of the two-part sharing contract. It is found that whether an airport is subject to competition is critical to the welfare consequences of alternative revenue sharing arrangements.     

Airline’s choice of aircraft size – Explanations and implications

When facing a growth in demand, airlines tend to respond more by means of increasing frequencies than by increasing aircraft size. At many of the world’s largest airports there are fewer than 100 passengers per air transport movement, although congestion and delays are growing. Furthermore, demand for air transport is predicted to continue growing but aircraft size is not. This paper aims to investigate and explain this phenomenon, the choice of relatively small aircraft. It seems that this choice is associated mainly with the benefits of high frequency service, the competitive environment in which airlines operate and the way airport capacity is allocated and priced. Regression analysis of over 500 routes in the US, Europe and Asia provides empirical evidence that the choice of aircraft size is mainly influenced by route characteristics (e.g. distance, level of demand and level of competition) and almost not at all by airport characteristics (e.g. number of runways and whether the airport is a hub or slot coordinated). We discuss the implications of this choice of aircraft size and suggest that some market imperfections exist in the airline industry leading airlines to offer excessive frequency on some routes and too low frequency on others.     

Airport–Airline interaction: some food for thought

Abstract

We provide an interpretive analysis of vertical relations between airports and carriers, while assessing the way in which deregulation of the airline market and the privatization of airports have created incentives for airport–airline interaction. In particular, if the vertical structure approach has become the standard approach in air transport research, we add to the literature by discussing three issues that we believe need further understanding. The three issues that we think should be the focus of future research on airport–airline interaction are (i) incomplete contracts and asymmetric information structure; (ii) upstream horizontal complementarities; and (iii) airports as two-sided platforms.     

Serving vs. settling: What drives the establishment of low-cost carriers’ foreign bases?

This paper uses a probit model on a cross-sectional dataset of 202 airports and 29 airlines to assess the drivers for the establishment of foreign bases by European low-cost carriers (LCCs). We find that managerial, organizational, and environmental factors impact on foreign base establishment. In particular, there is evidence that the presence of a growth-oriented firm leader and the strategic importance of an airport for an airline significantly increase the probability of the presence of bases, while national unit labor costs, the volatility of flight operations and the membership of an LCC in an airline group significantly decrease this probability.     

Airport demand management: The operations research and economics perspectives and potential synergies

Airport demand management aims to mitigate air traffic congestion by limiting the imbalances between demand and capacity at busy airports through administrative measures (e.g., slot controls) or economic incentives (e.g., congestion pricing, slot auctions). This paper provides an integrated synthesis of the contributions of the fields of operations research/management science (OR/MS) and economics on the subject matter. From an operating standpoint, assessing the benefits of demand management requires estimates of airport capacity and models of airport on-time performance. From a managerial standpoint, the design of demand management mechanisms can be supported by decision-making models of flight scheduling. From an economic standpoint, the welfare impact of congestion pricing, slot controls and slot auctions depends on the market structure at the airport. This paper proposes an integrated framework that underscores the interdependencies between these operating, managerial and economic aspects to foster cross-disciplinary approaches toward more effective demand management policies at busy airports worldwide.     

Performance based clustering for benchmarking of US airports

Managing service operations is gaining significant attention in both academic and practitioner circles. In this broad area, performance evaluation and process improvement of airlines and air carriers has been the focus of several studies. Although efficient airport operations are critical for improved performance of airlines and air carriers, few studies have focused on airport performance measurement. This study evaluates the operational efficiencies of 44 major US airports across 5 years using multi-criteria non-parametric models. These efficiency scores are treated by a clustering method in identifying benchmarks for improving poorly performing airports. Efficiency measures are based on four resource input measures including airport operational costs, number of airport employees, gates and runways, and five output measures including operational revenue, passenger flow, commercial and general aviation movement, and total cargo transportation. The methodology presented here can be generalized to other industries and institutions.     

Airport privatization in congested hub–spoke networks

This paper investigates the airport privatization issue. One congested hub and two linked local airports serve symmetric hub carriers. Passengers valuate the congestion delay cost and benefit from greater frequencies. The government considers privatizing either the hub or local airports. We find that in each privatizing scenario, welfare-maximizing public airport(s) set a charge below their operating costs in order to fully coordinate the high charge of privatized airport(s). If this fiscal deficit is not allowed, each scenario causes distortion. Interestingly, the distortion—and hence welfare losses—in privatizing a hub are smaller (larger) than those in privatizing both local airports when both passengers’ valuations are small (large); this is exactly the case when privatized local airports are strategic substitutes (complements). We also surprisingly find that retaining the hub airport as public and privatizing one or both local airports achieves the same market outcomes. We further find that if all airports are privatized, welfare becomes worse than the other scenarios; the hub airport charges lower (higher) prices than local airports when both local airports are strategic substitutes (complements).     

Joint impact of competition,ownership form and economic regulation on airport performance and pricing

The combined impact of ownership form, economic regulation and competition on airport performance is analyzed using data envelopment analysis to measure cost efficiency in the first stage and regression analysis to measure the impact of the environment in the second stage. The empirical results of an analysis of European and Australian airports over a 10 year timeframe reveal that under relatively non-competitive conditions, public airports operate less cost efficiently than fully private airports. Irrespective of ownership form, regulation is necessary to emulate competitive forces thus pushing airport management towards cost efficiency and reasonable pricing policies. Under potential regional or hub competition, economic regulation inhibits airports of any ownership form from operating and pricing efficiently. Although public and fully private airports operate equally efficiently in a competitive setting, private airports still set higher aeronautical charges. Furthermore, mixed ownership forms with a majority public holding are neither cost efficient nor low price, irrespective of the level of competition.     

Market power and its determinants in the Chinese airline industry

This paper first measures the degree of Chinese airlines’ market power by using Lerner index, and then investigates its determinants. Our empirical results show that a certain degree of market power exists in the Chinese airline industry. Of the three dominant carriers, Air China exhibits the strongest market power whereas China Eastern Airlines the weakest, with China Southern Airlines being in the middle. Furthermore, the extent of market power varies significantly among regional markets, with China’s northeast region as the strongest, followed by the eastern and western regions, and the central area as the weakest. We also find a hub-premium effect similar to the result found in the US airline market. Our analysis shows that the existence of high-speed rail and low-cost carriers, income level, population size, seasonality, and number of competing airlines are the main determinants of competition in the Chinese airline market.     

Demand uncertainty and airport capacity choice

This study analyzes the effects of demand uncertainty on airport capacity choices. It shows that demand uncertainty will not change optimal capacity choice if demand variation is low and capacity cost is high; otherwise the optimal airport capacity under demand uncertainty will be larger than the case when a deterministic mean demand is considered. These conclusions are robust with respect to the different market structures considered in this study and hold for both profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing airports. The moderating effects of commercial revenue, capital cost, and airport operation cost on airport capacity choice are qualitatively the same in the cases of uncertain demand and deterministic demand.     

Modelling the resilience,friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event

This paper deals with developing a methodology for estimating the resilience, friability, and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event. The network consists of airports and airspace/air routes between them where airlines operate their flights. Resilience is considered as the ability of the network to neutralize the impacts of disruptive event(s). Friability implies reducing the network’s existing resilience due to removing particular nodes/airports and/or links/air routes, and consequently cancelling the affected airline flights. The costs imply additional expenses imposed on airports, airlines, and air passengers as the potentially most affected actors/stakeholders due to mitigating actions such as delaying, cancelling and rerouting particular affected flights. These actions aim at maintaining both the network’s resilience and safety at the acceptable level under given conditions.Large scale disruptive events, which can compromise the resilience and friability of a given air transport network, include bad weather, failures of particular (crucial) network components, the industrial actions of the air transport staff, natural disasters, terrorist threats/attacks and traffic incidents/accidents.The methodology is applied to the selected real-life case under given conditions. In addition, this methodology could be used for pre-selecting the location of airline hub airport(s), assessing the resilience of planned airline schedules and the prospective consequences, and designing mitigating measures before, during, and in the aftermath of a disruptive event. As such, it could, with slight modifications, be applied to transport networks operated by other transport modes.     

Reprint of “Modelling the resilience,friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event”

This paper deals with developing a methodology for estimating the resilience, friability, and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event. The network consists of airports and airspace/air routes between them where airlines operate their flights. Resilience is considered as the ability of the network to neutralize the impacts of disruptive event(s). Friability implies reducing the network’s existing resilience due to removing particular nodes/airports and/or links/air routes, and consequently cancelling the affected airline flights. The costs imply additional expenses imposed on airports, airlines, and air passengers as the potentially most affected actors/stakeholders due to mitigating actions such as delaying, cancelling and rerouting particular affected flights. These actions aim at maintaining both the network’s resilience and safety at the acceptable level under given conditions.Large scale disruptive events, which can compromise the resilience and friability of a given air transport network, include bad weather, failures of particular (crucial) network components, the industrial actions of the air transport staff, natural disasters, terrorist threats/attacks and traffic incidents/accidents.The methodology is applied to the selected real-life case under given conditions. In addition, this methodology could be used for pre-selecting the location of airline hub airport(s), assessing the resilience of planned airline schedules and the prospective consequences, and designing mitigating measures before, during, and in the aftermath of a disruptive event. As such, it could, with slight modifications, be applied to transport networks operated by other transport modes.     

The effect of code-share agreements on the temporal profile of airline fares

This paper aims at investigating how the pricing strategy of European airlines is affected by code-share agreements on international routes. Our data cover several routes linking the main UK airports to many European destinations and includes posted fares collected at different days before departure. By analyzing the temporal profile of airline fares, we identify three main results. First, code-share increases fares especially for early bookers. Second, the higher prices in code-shared flights are offered by marketing carriers. Finally, in single operator code-shared flights (unilateral code-share), the pricing profile is flatter than under parallel code-share.     

One price for all? Price discrimination and market captivity: Evidence from the Italian city-pair markets

This paper tests whether, and to what extent, airlines exploit market captivity by using price discrimination strategies. The Italian passenger market is particularly fit for this purpose, given the high differentials in the degree of the inter-modal competition amongst domestic connections. Results show that, ceteris paribus, airlines adopt a different pricing behaviour depending on the degree of inter-modal market captivity. First, in highly concentrated markets with respect to air competitors, airlines price higher when the inter-modal competition is limited. This proves that inter-modal market captivity strengthens the effect of market power. Second, the inter-temporal price discrimination leads to a J-shaped distribution of fares over time, which is more pronounced when the inter-modal competition is effective. This suggests that airlines need to adopt a pricing technique that allows for a greater market segmentation in order to compete successfully with high-speed rail transport and to extract a larger part of passengers’ surplus. These results are relevant in terms of transport-investment implications and competition policy. The indirect benefits that investments in rail infrastructure would yield through downward pressures on competing airline fares should be embedded in any cost-benefit analysis of high-speed networks investments and in any policy evaluation of measures that aim to reduce the territorial gaps in infrastructure endowment and accessibility.     

Airport congestion pricing and passenger types

We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.     

Congestion spill effects of Heathrow and Frankfurt airports on connection traffic in European and Gulf hub airports

We develop two stage fixed-effects single-spill and double-spill models for congestion connection spills of London Heathrow and Frankfurt airports on 9 hub airports in Europe and the Gulf. Our panel data covers connection traffic from 1997 to 2013 for Heathrow and 1997 to 2011 for Frankfurt. The single-spill results support strongly that the connection spills from Heathrow’s capacity limitations do strengthen competing hub airports of major alliance groups and to a lesser degree one Gulf hub. The double-spill model for Heathrow and Frankfurt shows nearly asymmetric overall spill characteristics between the two airports. Our results underline the influence of airline network strategies on congestion spills as European airline networks are shaped by alliances and umbrella mergers. Thus, the airline network perspective in airport capacity expansion decisions needs to play a greater role, as indicated by our asymmetric results for overall spill effects between Heathrow and Frankfurt airports.     

Optimization of airport bus timetable in cultivation period considering passenger dynamic airport choice under conditions of uncertainty

An airport bus service, which is newly introduced in a multi-airport region, commonly leads to a gradually increasing market share of airports until a new state of equilibrium is reached. With the goal of speeding up and enlarging the increase in market share, this paper proposes a timetable optimization model by incorporating reactions of airport-loyal passengers to bus service quality. The simulation part of the model, which uses cumulative prospect theory to formulate discrete airport choices, results in predicted passenger demand needed in the optimization part. Then a genetic algorithm for multi-objective optimization problems called NSGA-II is applied to solve the model. To illustrate the model, the “Lukou airport-Wuxi” airport bus in China is taken as an example. The results show that the optimized timetables shorten the cultivation period and impel the market share to grow rapidly.     

Investigation of environmental justice analysis in airport planning practice from 2000 to 2010

Municipal airport owners and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regularly evaluate capacity and demand to decide if and when airports need more infrastructure. New infrastructure can alter the profile of noise, emissions, and land use, which may affect the quality of life for airport-adjacent communities. When the FAA and airport owners initiate infrastructure expansion, they must conduct environmental justice analysis to measure the distribution of negative externalities on nearby communities. This research investigates the environmental justice methodologies and narratives reported in planning documents for nineteen airport capacity expansions planned or deployed from 2000 to 2010 in the United States. The mixed-methods approach analyzes airport operations data, spatial demographic data, and planning artifacts to determine whether the environmental justice analyses were robust. This research proposes alternative metrics, the ‘Risk of disproportionate impact’ and ‘Capacity strain’, to further contextualize the presence of protected population groups alongside capacity needs. The main finding of the study is that the planning documents did not consistently detect environmental justice impacts, nor did they consistently confer importance to those impacts when high proportions of protected populations were detected. As a result, the social costs of collective airport expansion are unclear and likely underestimated. This study identifies two limitations that undermined the environmental justice analysis throughout the airport sample: (1) inconsistent methodological choices impeded the detection of impacts and, (2) narrative interpretations tended to ‘null’ the finding even when impacts were detected.