EPC/交钥匙合同条件下的承包商风险管理

EPC／交钥匙合同条件下承包商将承担项目风险的大多数，承包商风险管理问题受到了工程项目管理专家学者的广泛关注。文章结合新版FIDIC《EPC／交钥匙工程合同条件》，运用现代系统分析方法，对EPC／交钥匙合同条件下承包商风险进行详细分析研究，建立了EPC／交钥匙合同条件下的承包商风险的矩阵分析表，提出了EPC／交钥匙合同条件下的承包商风险管理策略。     

BT建设模式应注意的几个问题

从BT模式的概念入手,依托朝天门长江大桥项目,就BT模式项目的切入点、切入时机、合同技巧、选择合作伙伴,以及设计机构和设计管理的作用发表个人观点,最后对设计机构参与BT模式项目管理提出建设性意见。     

国际项目合同变更索赔案例分析

在国际工程中,越来越多地采用EPC和设计施工总承包等合同形式。在实施此类项目中,无论是作为总包还是分包,在合同管理中碰到的变更与索赔事项越来越频繁。如何加强合同管理、保护承包商的合同权利,避免损失日益成为一个重要的课题。本文以广东液化天然气接收站LNG项目为例,总结了变更与索赔的一些做法和经验。     

大型水利水电工程承包商施工索赔实践

在大型水利水电工程合同实施过程中承包商进行施工索赔是必然存在的.作为项目合同管理的重要内容,索赔贯穿于工程项目施工的全过程.承包商必须充分认识索赔工作的复杂性和特殊性,正确合理地进行实践操作.结合多个工程典型案例,对水利工程建设过程中的索赔条件、索赔内容进行讨论,对可能产生索赔的风险和索赔技巧进行分析.     

水工项目承包商施工索赔实践

作为项目合同管理的重要组成部分,工程索赔是经常发生的,同时也贯穿于施工全过程。承包商必须充分认识到索赔工作的复杂性和特殊性,正确合理地进行实践操作。总结论述目前水工市场常出现的承包商向业主的索赔问题,以便施工企业在生产经营中借鉴。     

高速公路工程项目总承包风险管理研究

本文从总承包商的角度研究高速公路工程项目的风险管理问题,提出将建设工程项目总承包风险管理相关理论和方法应用到高速公路工程项目的风险管理上来,对高速公路建设项目进行了生命周期各阶段的划分,从项目决策、工程设计,到项目施工、竣工验收等六个阶段的风险和不确定因素。在风险识别的基础上,进行了风险评价,对识别出的高速公路工程建设风险,提出了风险管理措施,针对高速公路建设项目的实际情况,总结出了适合工程项目特点的风险管理方法。     

纳卡拉煤码头工程合同变更和索赔管理

工程合同变更和索赔工作贯穿项目管理始终,是整个项目管理的重点工作。科学的工程合同变更和索赔管理既能为项目顺利实施保驾护航,又能保护项目经济效益,降低项目成本,增加项目利润。纳卡拉煤码头工程项目采用承包商加专业商务咨询顾问公司的模式,强化项目合同变更和索赔的全过程和精细化管理,赢得项目工期延期和经济补偿,最终圆满完成了海外港口工程项目管理目标。     

中国港湾公司获尼日利亚港口建设合同

据尼日利亚媒体报道,尼日利亚莱基港公司（LEKKIPORTCOMPANY）日前与中国港湾公司（CHEC）正式签署了总额为l076亿奈拉（约合6．79亿美元）的莱基深水港口建设合同。该合同采取了近年来国际工程市场中较为流行的EPC合同方式,即中国港湾公司将作为项目承包商,负责项目的设计、采购和施工,     

新版FIDIC合同条件中的"不可抗力"浅析

结合1999年第1版FIDIC合同中的有关条款,探讨了项目“不可抗力”的定义、确认、处理等相关问题．同时结合国际工程管理的实际经验提出一些建议,以利于提高我国承包商的合同管理水平。     

国际工程合同外收入结算工作理论与实践

在国际工程中,承包商的合同总收入包括两部分:(1)承包商与业主签订的合同总金额,它构成了合同收入的基本内容;(2)因工程变更、追加工程量、索赔、调价、奖励等形成的收入,该部分金额只有在符合规定时才能构成合同总收入。针对不同的合同外收入项,承包商需要掌握相关的理论和知识,并采取不同的措施。     

Workshop 4: Designing contracts/concessions: What has worked and what has not and why?: 12th International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport

A contract establishes a mutual relationship between an authority and an operator. From the point of view of the authority, it is a tactical level mechanism to achieve the strategic objectives of government. Management of contractors translate the requirements of contracts into operational practices to guide the day-to-day work of staff for the delivery of services. Much can go wrong with contracts for the provision of public transport services. Workshop participants identified and ranked 25 potential risk factors. The five most important factors, which relate to objectives, tender assessment, allocation of risks, financial viability and dispute management, were examined drawing on the 11 papers presented to the workshop. Matters that work, that do not and would make the most difference to the success of contracts were identified.     

FIDIC银皮书（EPC）合同条件下设计风险分析与管理

设计工作是EPC项目成功实施的最关键因素之一。在FIDIC彩虹系列中,银皮书合同条件下承包商不平衡地承担了更多的与设计相关的风险。文章列出了中国建筑企业常见的设计风险案例,全面分析与设计相关的FIDIC银皮书（EPC）合同条款,并紧扣关键三大合同要素,为防范不同阶段的设计工作风险,从合同商务实务和程序方面,提出合理化建议。     

简述建设工程设计合同的法律风险识别与防范

合同作为建设工程设计项目的载体,明确各方权责显得尤为重要.面对复杂的情况,如何准确识别法律风险,合理规避风险,做好防患于未然是需要重点研究的课题.从合同制定的全过程进行监控,合理分析合同签订、变更、履行、赔偿等各环节中可能遇到的状况和风险,使建设工程设计的进行达到预期效果.本文以合同的法律风险识别为出发点,阐述识别法律...     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

跨海大桥施工项目合同管理主要问题及对策

跨海大桥施工项目具有工程规模大、自然条件恶劣、施工技术复杂、施工风险性大等特点,与内河桥梁施工项目相比,其合同实施的条件更加复杂,合同管理的难度更大。结合杭州湾跨海大桥施工项目的实际,阐述了跨海大桥合同管理的主要内容及存在的主要问题,并提出了相应的解决对策。     

国际港口工程项目合同管理工作的探讨

以安哥拉某港扩建项目为例,结合国外港口工程项目管理工作经验与体会,对合同签订前到合同签订以及合同签订后管理所需要注意的问题进行分析和总结,探讨如何把项目合同管理与国外港口工程实际结合,供工程管理人员参考。     

基于风险分担的政府投资项目代建合同总价控制

政府投资项目实施代建制是传统自建模式的制度创新,其投资控制的责任通过市场化手段转移给代建人承担并通过合同机制实现了投资控制的硬约束。代建合同中对于代建人投资包干总价的确定与调整方式的约定成为影响投资控制成效的关键问题。针对代建项目采用设计概算作为投资包干总价的确定依据的不足和产生的超概问题,引入风险分担机制,剖析投资控制目标确定的风险分担原则,应由政府委托人与代建人分别承担相应的投资变化的风险和投资控制责任。代建合同投资包干总价的固定总价部分,由代建人承担全部投资变化的风险;可调价格部分由政府委托人承担的投资风险发生后,需要调整投资包干总价;讨论了总价合同中风险分担条款的设定及风险发生后的调价方法。     

Incompleteness and clarity in bus contracts: Identifying the nature of the ex ante and ex post perceptual divide

In the transport sector, many types of contracts exist. Some are very precise, and strive for completeness; others are very ‘light-weight’ and are incomplete. Bus and coach contracts, won through competitive tendering or negotiation, are typically incomplete in the sense of an inability to verify all the relevant obligations, as articulated through a set of deliverables. This paper draws on recent experiences in contract negotiation, and subsequent commitment in the bus sector, to identify what elements of the contracting regime have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal expected, and what the agent believed they were obliged to deliver. We develop a series of regression models to investigate the extent of discrepancy between the principal and the agents perceived ‘understanding’ of contract obligations. The empirical evidence, from a sample of bus operators, is used to identify the extent of perceived incompleteness and clarity across a sample of bus contracts. A noteworthy finding is the important role that a trusting partnership plays in reducing the barriers to establishing greater clarity of contract specification and obligations, and in recognition of the degree of contract completeness.     

BT模式在疏浚工程中的应用——唐山湾三岛旅游区内海疏浚吹填造陆项目

从BT项目的概念入手,介绍BT模式项目的运作过程,依托唐山湾三岛旅游区内海疏浚吹填造陆项目,就BT模式项目在疏浚工程应用中存在的风险及拟采取的应对措施进行分析,并对施工企业在疏浚工程中承接和运作BT项目提出建设性意见,从而让BT项目真正成为疏浚施工企业新的利润增长点,更好地提升企业的竞争力.