To competitively tender or to negotiate - Weighing up the choices in a mature market

A key attribute of competitive tendering for the periodic selection of operators of subsidised public transport services is to secure the provision of specified services at efficient cost levels. This has proved particularly effective where services were previously provided by an inefficient monopoly operator. The arguments for the adoption of competitive tendering in preference to negotiation with the incumbent operator may be less clear-cut in other cases.Consideration is given to both theoretical and practical insights into the relative merits of competitive tendering and negotiation approaches in such situations. The limited literature on the topic is reviewed and insights and lessons identified. Influencing issues include prior conditions, the nature of the supplier market, features of contracts, negotiating and competitive tendering strategies and practice, accountability and transparency, and long-term market implications. The evidence suggests that ‘one size does not fit all’, and the choice will depend on specific circumstances.The relative merits of the two approaches for renewal of bus contracts are considered with regard to Adelaide, for contracts which have previously been awarded through competitive tendering. The paper draws out the main factors that could influence the authority’s choice between the options, and discusses the relevance of the findings to other situations.     

Impact of regulation on the performances of long-distance transport services: A comparison of the different approaches in Sweden and Norway

Despite the many socio-economic similarities between Sweden and Norway, differences in jurisdiction, organisation, cooperation, and financing of long-distance passenger train and coach services have led to the development of four distinctively different ways of serving the markets. This paper describes how the train and coach markets have developed in the two countries, with emphasis on regulatory and industrial structure and a couple of performance variables.Looking at passenger rail, both countries separated infrastructure from operation over a decade ago. However, while Norwegian rail is characterised by an almost monopoly supplier, rail services in Sweden are partly decentralised to the responsibility of county authorities and are widely subjected to competitive tendering. The rest of the network is about to be opened up for on-the-track competition. Swedish Rail (SJ) has spent the last decades consolidating its core business (passenger rail) and sold out its other businesses. In contrast, the Norwegian state rail (NSB) has expanded its business to become a major bus operator and property owner, with extensions also into the Swedish market.The coach industry was more recently deregulated in both countries. The Swedish coach market is dominated by privately owned companies operating services to and from Stockholm. In Norway, state-owned NSB is a major coach operator on medium distance routes, and is also the largest partner of Nor-Way Bussekspress which totally dominates long-distance coach services. Further, the Norwegian coach market is characterised by cross-ownership and cooperation which has enabled an extensive route network which covers most of Norway.We find distinct differences in achievements in the two modes and in the two countries. Swedish rail services have succeeded in winning market shares and in renewing and developing both infrastructure and service levels to a greater extent than the Norwegian model. On the other hand, the Norwegian coach market seems to be more developed and efficient compared to its Swedish counterpart.The paper concludes with a discussion on the possible links between the different approaches and the performance observed, with the aim to stimulate further and more detailed research on some important issues.     

Contracting regimes for bus services: What have we learnt after 20 years?

This paper reviews a number of themes that have played a crucial role in the debate on alternative contracting regimes for the provision of urban bus services. We have selected four crucial issues to reflect on: (i) contractual regimes (in particular competitive tendering as compared to negotiated performance-based contracts, as means to award the rights to provide service); (ii) contract completeness (focussing on ex ante and ex post elements); (iii) building trust through partnership; and (iv) tactical or system level planning for bus services. Experience in these areas suggests that competitive tendering has frequently not lived up to expectations and that negotiation is likely in many circumstances to deliver better value for money.     

Are we doing it wrong or do we expect too much? Forces that push authorities to become public transport designers

This paper presents a number of reasons that are responsible for the disappointment of authorities in their operators’ efforts to develop public transport (PT) to the advantage of their travellers. The lessons drawn in this paper are based upon the competitive tendering experience of the authors and upon the results of meetings organised with parties involved in competitive tendering and aimed at exchanging lessons. There appears to be three main causes: (1) there is freedom for the operator, but the contract is bad; (2) there is freedom for the operator, there is a good contract, but there is no market; and (3) there is freedom for the operator, but the operator is not able to use it. The paper concludes with a few perspectives for improvement.     

Workshop report - Benchmarking the outcome of competitive tendering

Workshop 1 was concerned to identify the real results of competitive tendering, and experience on how to make it work better, using evidence from the rail and bus sectors in a large number of countries spread around the world. It was found that competitive tendering had generally been successful in terms of quality and costs, but problems had occurred in a number of cases, so careful attention must be paid to the design of tendering exercises, details of the contract, risk-sharing arrangements and the approach to any re-negotiation found to be necessary. As a result, an important conclusion is that the tendering authority needs a high degree of expertise in these issues; any thought that competitive tendering relieves the public authority of the need for expertise in public transport is mistaken.     

Competition in Brazilian bus and coach services - The results of recent competitive tendering processes

This paper analyses the terms and the results of a sample of some recent Brazilian bidding processes for the concession of public passenger transport services: namely, urban and metropolitan bus or regional coach services. The analysis is based on selected issues relating to competitiveness and upon the legal framework that applies in this sector. It was concluded that, given the lack of bidding processes for concessions in the bus and coach sector in Brazil, the fact that some bidding processes have been carried out should be considered a sign of progress. However, these auctions have not necessarily prioritised competitiveness, since many barriers to entry into the systems were imposed by the bidding terms. Future competitive tendering processes should seek to abide by stricter principles of competitiveness, if they wish to avoid the entire effort expended on conducting such processes serving only to mask nothing more than formal obedience to the law and to discredit the bidding process in the eyes of Brazilian citizens.     

Towards a simplified performance-linked value for money model as a reference point for bus contract payments

The burgeoning commitment to contracting the delivery of bus services through competitive tendering or negotiated performance-based contracts has been accompanied by as many contract payments schemes as there are contracts. We are now well placed to design a simplified performance-linked payment (SPLP) model that can be used as a reference point to ensure value for money, given the accumulation of experiences throughout the world which have revealed substantive common elements in contracts. Whether the payment to the operator is framed as a payment per passenger or as a payment per service kilometre, the SPLP identifies efficient subsidy outcomes that are linked to a proxy indicator of net social benefit per dollar of subsidy. We illustrate how the SPLP model can be applied to obtain the gross (subsidy) cost per passenger (or per passenger km) from measures of gross cost efficiency and network effectiveness. This model can then be used as part of a benchmarking activity to identify reference value of money prospects in respect of passengers per $ subsidy outlay by adjusting for influences not under the control of the service provider. A single framework to identify contract payments to operators, and to assess (i.e., benchmark) operator performance on critical KPIs, is provided by internalising critical key performance indicators (KPIs) in the design of the SPLP. The proposed SPLP model is sufficiently general to be independent of the procurement method (competitive tendered or negotiated, for example) and of the treatment of revenue allocation (net or gross based contracts), with the additional advantage of being able to assess value for money for government.     

Regulation,trust and contractual incentives around transport contracts – Is there anything bus operators can learn from public air service contracts?

This paper compares recent experiences in contract negotiation and subsequent commitment in public air services with the bus industry. The heart of the paper is a survey of European and Australian regional airlines, which we mirror with revealed experiences of bus operators. We aim to identify a number of elements in the contracting regimes that have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal (e.g., transport department) expected, and what the agent (airline or bus operator) believed they were obliged to deliver. Ultimately airline and bus services are similar in that public authorities procure transport services that are desirable for the society but would be unprofitable without government involvement. In both sectors (theoretically fairly similar) public transport contracts are used, and those usually include obligations and performance measurements. In terms of similarities, one of the surveyed contract details that had a perceived high clarity in both industries was “payment procedures” and amongst those with rather poor clarity was also in both industries “incentives to improve performance and grow patronage”. We also show differences between regional air services and bus operations with regard to performance measurement and pre-specified obligations. Because of the strong safety culture around air services we find that regulation and trusting partnerships are even more important to aviation than to the bus sector. Because of the high level of trust but also because of simpler and more complete contracts in aviation, there is much less (re-)negotiation going on compared to the bus operations.     

‘Regulated deregulation’ of local bus services—An appraisal of international developments

The deregulation of the British bus sector (outside London) in 1986 was the start of a debate on the merits of ‘deregulation’ and ‘competitive tendering’. The period that followed was rich in lessons. New Zealand was at the time the only other country engaging in a reform based upon market initiative (implemented in 1991). Other countries chose for a less extreme and more consensual way to introduce competitive incentives, choosing the fundamentally different competitive tendering (CT) path. As a result, the so-called ‘Scandinavian model’ developed, based upon the London example of route tendering. Later the Netherlands adopted a network tendering approach, resembling the French practice of network tendering though with more operator freedom.     

Commercial public bus transport services in Germany: How a market in motion struggles with its regulatory framework

After decades of stagnation, the competitive market for commercial public bus transport services in Germany is beginning to move. Nevertheless, compared to the total market volume, the number of cases where competition is observable remains small. An empirical analysis of competition in the commercial services market as compared to competition in the non-commercial services market confirms that entry barriers do exist. These barriers clearly impede competitive developments in this embryonic market, which relies on the market initiatives of operators to develop. The paper identifies a key entry barrier in the institutional framework: for potential market entrants, the overall uncertainty regarding competitive procedures for commercial services is significantly higher than usual in tendering procedures. This high uncertainty poses the main disadvantage for newcomers as compared to incumbents.     

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance.The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county’s role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives.     

Long-term development of express coach services in Britain

Express coach services compete for longer distance market with car and rail, and largely cater for the leisure, tourism, and visiting friends and relatives. markets. Britain deregulated its express coach system in 1980, and it is now opportune to examine long-term impacts of that change. The initial impacts were reviewed by the authors in 1986 (Robbins & White, 1986) but such impacts do not necessarily match long-term outcomes. Monitoring of the British system has been conducted by examining service changes and data on ridership, together with financial performance of the main operator groups and technical press coverage. It can be shown that a dominant position has been retained by the major operator (National Express), with a continued decline in the role of smaller independent operators in the all-year-round daily network. However, new competition has emerged from other large groups (most notably Stagecoach ‘Megabus’ in 2003). The paper analyses the operating and marketing strategies of the new operator and contrasts these strategies with those adopted in the 1980s. Implications for the future development of the network in Britain are outlined.     

Changing public transport governance in Dutch metropoles: To tender or not to tender

With winds of change from the European Commission reaching the Netherlands, the national government altered the Law on Passenger Transport in 2000 to best reflect European demands. This new law meant competitive tendering became obligatory. At first, the metropolitan transport authorities in the three largest cities (Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam) were granted an extended deadline for tendering. However, due to shifting winds from Brussels, in 2007 the Dutch national government dropped the obligation to tender for the three cities. Suddenly the authorities had to decide for themselves whether or not to tender. This article describes the different routes and outcomes of the three metropolitan authorities. Where the metropolitan authority in Rotterdam aimed at conservation of their existing model, the authorities of Amsterdam and The Hague embraced change. In The Hague conformation to the letter of the law seemed an important driver, whereas confrontation between different interests in the region was the starting point for change in Amsterdam.     

A model for forecasting future supply of shipping services at Australian ports

This paper aims to develop an integrated model for forecasting both the number of ship visits and their characteristics in the medium and long term. Knowledge of future shipping trends for any port is no doubt important, as the future number of ship visits and their characteristics may have implications for the physical facilities of a port. In addition, more reliance on tonnages as a revenue source has made this knowledge more valuable. The proposed model identifies such major economic determinants as the expected trade throughput, world shipping trends, standards of facilities and future plans of shipping companies/agents. The model examines three possible scenarios for the Port of Melbourne and produces a range of shipping forecasts based on certain assumptions. From the model the major findings were:

world trends in shipping did not have any immediate impact on the shipping trends at the Port of Melbourne;

Future shipping services at the Port of Melbourne in the next 11 years are most likely to be determined by trade demand rather than by technological developments overseas;

there has been no evidence to indicate that the Port of Melbourne has been excluded from the schedule of general cargo ships due to the Port's physical constraints.     

Strategic alliances in the container shipping industry: a global perspective

This paper examines developments in container shipping in light of the formation of strategic alliances by many of the leading companies. It focuses on three features: the transformation of services, the evolution of the fleet, and the adjustments made to the ports of call. These elements are analysed on a global basis for 3 years: 1989, 1994 and 1999. Some of the changes wrought by the alliances are identified, including the spread and intensification of services, and the deployment of the largest vessels on alliance routes. While the individual companies that have come together in alliances are serving many more ports than before, it is also demonstrated that the total number of ports served by the industry has remained constant. The results are interpreted in the context of globalization that is tending to impose greater standardization on the container shipping industry.     

Strategic alliances in the container shipping industry: a global perspective

This paper examines developments in container shipping in light of the formation of strategic alliances by many of the leading companies. It focuses on three features: the transformation of services, the evolution of the fleet, and the adjustments made to the ports of call. These elements are analysed on a global basis for 3 years: 1989, 1994 and 1999. Some of the changes wrought by the alliances are identified, including the spread and intensification of services, and the deployment of the largest vessels on alliance routes. While the individual companies that have come together in alliances are serving many more ports than before, it is also demonstrated that the total number of ports served by the industry has remained constant. The results are interpreted in the context of globalization that is tending to impose greater standardization on the container shipping industry.     

The adaptation of the Polish shipping companies to market conditions

At the end of the eighties, fundamental changes took place in Polish shipping. Implementation of the market economy system was at first demonstrated in the introduction of the principles of self-dependence, self-government and self-financing of the shipping companies. Privatization performed a key role in the program of transformation of the centrally planned system into market oriented financially independent shipping organizations. The previous principle of the necessary participation of the home fleet in transporting domestic sea-borne trade has been mostly replaced by cross-trade. Many shipping services have left its basic ports in the country for a West European basis, securing alimentation of home and transit cargoes by feeder-service systems. Joint stock companies in shipping with substantial shares of foreign capital are welcomed, and the previously obligatory system of administrative methods of the state monopoly has been abolished. The principles of shipping policy represented in the past by Poland and also by UNCTAD in the 1960s have lost their impact and must be change and adapted to the new demands of the shipping markets.     

Engaging the paratransit sector in Cape Town on public transport reform: Progress,process and risks

The South African government in 2006 initiated an urban public transport reform programme reliant on the introduction of new bus rapid transit (BRT) systems. Affected paratransit operators can opt to be incorporated in these systems by forming new operating companies, but must withdraw their existing services from proposed routes. Cape Town's first phase of BRT operations came online in 2011, and operator engagement has focussed on this phase. The attitudes within this city's paratransit sector in relation to future phases, and to the broader reform policy, remain largely untested. In view of this sector's past resistance to government-led proposals, and the current phase avoiding areas with the highest concentrations of operators, the current engagement process's outcomes may not be adequate indicators of future prospects.