Contracting regimes for bus services: What have we learnt after 20 years?

This paper reviews a number of themes that have played a crucial role in the debate on alternative contracting regimes for the provision of urban bus services. We have selected four crucial issues to reflect on: (i) contractual regimes (in particular competitive tendering as compared to negotiated performance-based contracts, as means to award the rights to provide service); (ii) contract completeness (focussing on ex ante and ex post elements); (iii) building trust through partnership; and (iv) tactical or system level planning for bus services. Experience in these areas suggests that competitive tendering has frequently not lived up to expectations and that negotiation is likely in many circumstances to deliver better value for money.     

Goal achievement with trusting partnerships at the tactical level

Recent Thredbo Conferences have begun to explore the importance of the relationship between public transport service purchaser and provider in the development of successful public transport services. However, practical examples to test the trusting partnership model are rare. Bus service planning and delivery in Melbourne, Australia, has pioneered the trusting partnership approach, from agreement about desirable service standards and requisite operator qualifications (at the Tactical level) to detailed service delivery contracts. New negotiated performance-based metropolitan bus contracts commenced in January 2009, embodying principles discussed in previous Thredbo Conferences. This paper reports on the Tactical planning process that agreed service standards and the subsequent contract negotiation process, reflecting a trusting partnership between purchaser and provider, while remaining transparent and accountable and maintaining performance pressure on the provider. It shows how patronage growth rates have increased dramatically and identifies areas where further enhancements should be explored in the contracting area.     

To competitively tender or to negotiate - Weighing up the choices in a mature market

A key attribute of competitive tendering for the periodic selection of operators of subsidised public transport services is to secure the provision of specified services at efficient cost levels. This has proved particularly effective where services were previously provided by an inefficient monopoly operator. The arguments for the adoption of competitive tendering in preference to negotiation with the incumbent operator may be less clear-cut in other cases.Consideration is given to both theoretical and practical insights into the relative merits of competitive tendering and negotiation approaches in such situations. The limited literature on the topic is reviewed and insights and lessons identified. Influencing issues include prior conditions, the nature of the supplier market, features of contracts, negotiating and competitive tendering strategies and practice, accountability and transparency, and long-term market implications. The evidence suggests that ‘one size does not fit all’, and the choice will depend on specific circumstances.The relative merits of the two approaches for renewal of bus contracts are considered with regard to Adelaide, for contracts which have previously been awarded through competitive tendering. The paper draws out the main factors that could influence the authority’s choice between the options, and discusses the relevance of the findings to other situations.     

Regulation,trust and contractual incentives around transport contracts – Is there anything bus operators can learn from public air service contracts?

This paper compares recent experiences in contract negotiation and subsequent commitment in public air services with the bus industry. The heart of the paper is a survey of European and Australian regional airlines, which we mirror with revealed experiences of bus operators. We aim to identify a number of elements in the contracting regimes that have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal (e.g., transport department) expected, and what the agent (airline or bus operator) believed they were obliged to deliver. Ultimately airline and bus services are similar in that public authorities procure transport services that are desirable for the society but would be unprofitable without government involvement. In both sectors (theoretically fairly similar) public transport contracts are used, and those usually include obligations and performance measurements. In terms of similarities, one of the surveyed contract details that had a perceived high clarity in both industries was “payment procedures” and amongst those with rather poor clarity was also in both industries “incentives to improve performance and grow patronage”. We also show differences between regional air services and bus operations with regard to performance measurement and pre-specified obligations. Because of the strong safety culture around air services we find that regulation and trusting partnerships are even more important to aviation than to the bus sector. Because of the high level of trust but also because of simpler and more complete contracts in aviation, there is much less (re-)negotiation going on compared to the bus operations.     

Workshop report - A successful contractual setting

Successful public transport service contracts can be judged against procedural and outcome criteria, located within an integrated strategic, tactical and operational level framework for planning and delivery. Clear goal setting at the strategic level sets the basis for supportive tactical system planning and for service delivery that meets goals. The workshop considers relevant success criteria and key matters that need to be resolved for their achievement. Market growth potential and the governmental attitude to supporting service growth are important issues shaping the contractual environment. The growing interest in negotiated performance-based contracts and the role of trust between the operator and the authority are also matters for particular attention.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance.The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county’s role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives.     

Workshop 1: Performance measurement and compliance

This workshop discussed challenges of measuring the performance of transport contracts, which is usually achieved by benchmarking the relevant services against a few key performance indicators (KPIs). Such KPIs (the workshop identified cost efficiency, service quality and safety/security as the top three) can be explicitly included in the contracts (with a focus on compliance) or can be rather informal and part of a trusting partnership. Limited availability of good data and appropriate information technology systems appear to be the greatest challenges within developed markets. In the context of creating a formal market (such as the South African taxi market), which encourages public transport measurement and compliance, our findings suggest that it is important to set as a first step minimum standards to address the backlog with respect to establishing performance measurement regimes.     

Risk and reward in public transportation contracting

The workshop discusses and documents a number of countries’ experiences regarding risk and reward in the delivery of public transport and determines the way in which competitive pressures actually work (or not) to deliver efficient and effective services. Papers are grouped into three main themes, i.e., public versus private management; negotiated versus competitively tendered contracts; and measures to improve performance. This chapter begins with a brief overview of each of the eight papers. This is followed by a section that out the discussions that emanated from the papers. Finally, the main policy and research recommendations are presented.     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

The 2008 New Zealand public transport management act: Rationale, key provisions, and parallels with the United Kingdom

In January 2009, following a lengthy industry review and consultation process, the New Zealand Public Transport Management Act (PTMA) came into force. The Act allows Regional Transport Authorities, as the primary procurers of public transport services, to place either a control or a contracting requirement upon services that are registered as commercial requiring no subsidy. The imposition of either the control or the contracting requirement is designed to facilitate greater system integration, improve service continuity and enhance services to the customer, andallow the Authority to invest in key strategic projects, such as integrated fares and ticketing, so as to grow patronage.The PTMA’s other objective is to ensure improved value for public subsidies. Recent years have seen significant subsidy inflation for seemingly little commensurate benefits. The Act will allow the Regional Transport Authority to achieve greater value for money through improved farebox, a shift to longer, larger contracts to increase competition in the market, a more appropriate allocation of risk, and the removal of the ability of operators to ‘game’ the current system by using strategically placed commercial services as barriers to competition.Similar concerns have also stimulated new legislation in the UK and this paper illustrates the parallels in the environment and proposed response.     

Ocean shipping deregulation restructures the liner shipping industry

Significant pro-competitive changes were made to the Shipping Act by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA). The most notable of these was the shift away from public tariffs and publicly available contract rates to confidential rates using individually negotiated service contracts. The number of individual member service contracts has risen dramatically since OSRA went into effect in 1999. These statistics support the argument that OSRA was able to bring more competition to the industry. However, the theory and empirical evidence of the Act’s success in improving the performance of the liner industry serving the Transatlantic and Transpacific trade routes, which are two major trunk roads subject to the jurisdiction of the US, are not so compelling. This article employs the theory of joint product to assess the impact of OSRA on the shipping market structure and competition of two major east–west arteries after 1999. This article considers head haul and backhaul container shipments as joint products. Two simple statistical equations are derived to reinterpret Smith’s condition of joint product. The empirical results confirm that the market structure of Transatlantic and Transpacific trade lanes are competitive.     

Quality incentives and quality outcomes in procured public transport - Case study Stockholm

Gross contracts appear to be the most common contract form for procured public transport in Sweden and elsewhere. This contract form, it has been argued, gives weak incentives for operators to deliver the desired quality level. Therefore many procuring public transport authorities amend contracts with quality incentives.This paper examines how such quality incentives influence quality outcomes with focus on cancelled departures and delays. The main findings are that the introduction of quality incentives are correlated with both increases and decreases of measured quality outcomes.We hypothesise that the results are driven by underlying cost changes for achieving desired quality objectives that exceed the possible revenues from the incentives. In interviews with the Stockholm public transport authority (SL) and some operators, two central observations surface. The first is that there are causes for quality failures that are not solely the responsibility of operators and that these are therefore not fully reached by the incentives, and the second is that the operators believe that they have exhausted what they can do under the current contracts.     

Incentives to reduce port inefficiency: a theoretical approach

Over the last decades, the European Union (EU) has devoted a large amount of effort and money to projects aimed at boosting some of its maritime corridors as a modal alternative to road or rail freight transport. However, the overall design of most of these programmes has ex post revealed as very ineffective. This paper suggests that promoting port efficiency might be a more suitable target to increase the modal split of Short Sea Shipping (SSS) than subsidizing firms to transfer cargo from road to sea. But defining ‘port efficiency’ is a complex task and, therefore, granting money directly to port authorities could also generate perverse moral hazard effects, particularly when the improvements are difficult to monitor and many investments are non-refundable. The European Court of Auditors points out that millions of EU public port finance was wasted on empty terminal and other unused infrastructure. The objective of this paper is to design a proper subsidy to promote SSS by encouraging port improvements through a proper system of incentives. As a policy recommendation, in this paper we propose the development of a subsidy per inefficiency-reduction unit.     

Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model

Privatisation has led to a growing interest in more complex contractual forms designed to give public transport operators the incentives for effort that maximise value for money. Contract theory provides a rich research basis for selecting an appropriate contractual form, with an emphasis on the effects of uncertainty and asymmetric information. To date, however, there have been few applications of contract theory in the field of transport. This paper identifies the key empirical results from the multi-disciplinary literature to help transport researchers and practitioners place contractual decision-making in the broader theoretical context, suggesting aspects of transport contracting that merit future research.     

Who pays the ferryman? An analysis of the ferry passenger's selection dilemma

Purpose: based on the known in the literature difference between expected and perceived quality, this study examines the factors and the ways that influence the passenger to select a ferry operator.

Methodology/approach: the research attempts to shed some light on the importance of every selection determinant by employing multinomial logistics analysis which identify that the convenience determinant is pivotal when selecting a service.

Findings: the main findings of the study indicate that among six different combinations of factors—models—perceived service quality together with price and convenience (satisfaction determinants) best describe the choice procedure followed by the passenger. The evidence is drawn from a survey performed in the Greek coastal shipping sector.

Originality/value of the paper: to survive in a competitive market, organizations must continuously strive to understand their customers' wants and needs. Although this is a highly recognized issue in the marketing agenda little or no research has been done on passenger satisfaction and the subsequent selection of a ferry operator.

Practical implications: by using the findings of this work, ferry operators may deeply and timely understand their customers' purchasing behaviour and adapt their marketing policies especially in a competitive and fast-changing environment.     

A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA

Purpose: based on the known in the literature difference between expected and perceived quality, this study examines the factors and the ways that influence the passenger to select a ferry operator.

Methodology/approach: the research attempts to shed some light on the importance of every selection determinant by employing multinomial logistics analysis which identify that the convenience determinant is pivotal when selecting a service.

Findings: the main findings of the study indicate that among six different combinations of factors—models—perceived service quality together with price and convenience (satisfaction determinants) best describe the choice procedure followed by the passenger. The evidence is drawn from a survey performed in the Greek coastal shipping sector.

Originality/value of the paper: to survive in a competitive market, organizations must continuously strive to understand their customers’ wants and needs. Although this is a highly recognized issue in the marketing agenda little or no research has been done on passenger satisfaction and the subsequent selection of a ferry operator.

Practical implications: by using the findings of this work, ferry operators may deeply and timely understand their customers’ purchasing behaviour and adapt their marketing policies especially in a competitive and fast-changing environment.     

Competition model of cruise home ports based on the cruise supply chain – based on China cruise market

This paper addresses issues of cruise home port competition based on the cruise supply chain. A pricing model of the cruise market is developed considering the competitive cooperation behaviors of the participants in the cruise supply chain. Furthermore, a model of cruise home port competition is developed to investigate the impacts of subsidy participants in the cruise supply chain on cruise home ports. The results indicate that subsidy policies change the market equilibrium, promote the upstream and downstream integration of cruise supply chain, and enhance cruise home port competitiveness. Subsidies to cruise line increase the payoffs of cruise supply chain and ports’ profit. Subsidies to travel agency decrease passenger costs and improve all ports’ profits. For the long-term development of cruise home port, the consequents can be used as policy suggestions.     

国际工程合同外收入结算工作理论与实践

在国际工程中,承包商的合同总收入包括两部分:(1)承包商与业主签订的合同总金额,它构成了合同收入的基本内容;(2)因工程变更、追加工程量、索赔、调价、奖励等形成的收入,该部分金额只有在符合规定时才能构成合同总收入。针对不同的合同外收入项,承包商需要掌握相关的理论和知识,并采取不同的措施。     

Are we doing it wrong or do we expect too much? Forces that push authorities to become public transport designers

This paper presents a number of reasons that are responsible for the disappointment of authorities in their operators’ efforts to develop public transport (PT) to the advantage of their travellers. The lessons drawn in this paper are based upon the competitive tendering experience of the authors and upon the results of meetings organised with parties involved in competitive tendering and aimed at exchanging lessons. There appears to be three main causes: (1) there is freedom for the operator, but the contract is bad; (2) there is freedom for the operator, there is a good contract, but there is no market; and (3) there is freedom for the operator, but the operator is not able to use it. The paper concludes with a few perspectives for improvement.