Regulation,trust and contractual incentives around transport contracts – Is there anything bus operators can learn from public air service contracts?

This paper compares recent experiences in contract negotiation and subsequent commitment in public air services with the bus industry. The heart of the paper is a survey of European and Australian regional airlines, which we mirror with revealed experiences of bus operators. We aim to identify a number of elements in the contracting regimes that have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal (e.g., transport department) expected, and what the agent (airline or bus operator) believed they were obliged to deliver. Ultimately airline and bus services are similar in that public authorities procure transport services that are desirable for the society but would be unprofitable without government involvement. In both sectors (theoretically fairly similar) public transport contracts are used, and those usually include obligations and performance measurements. In terms of similarities, one of the surveyed contract details that had a perceived high clarity in both industries was “payment procedures” and amongst those with rather poor clarity was also in both industries “incentives to improve performance and grow patronage”. We also show differences between regional air services and bus operations with regard to performance measurement and pre-specified obligations. Because of the strong safety culture around air services we find that regulation and trusting partnerships are even more important to aviation than to the bus sector. Because of the high level of trust but also because of simpler and more complete contracts in aviation, there is much less (re-)negotiation going on compared to the bus operations.     

Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model

Privatisation has led to a growing interest in more complex contractual forms designed to give public transport operators the incentives for effort that maximise value for money. Contract theory provides a rich research basis for selecting an appropriate contractual form, with an emphasis on the effects of uncertainty and asymmetric information. To date, however, there have been few applications of contract theory in the field of transport. This paper identifies the key empirical results from the multi-disciplinary literature to help transport researchers and practitioners place contractual decision-making in the broader theoretical context, suggesting aspects of transport contracting that merit future research.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

Hybrid urban transport systems in developing countries: Portents and prospects

Some South African cities have initiated public transport transformation projects which, in most cases, ultimately envisage the in toto replacement of paratransit operations with formalised BRT systems. There are two likely outcomes: (1) complex negotiations with existing operators and budget constraints will result in the in toto transformation occurring over an extended period of time; or (2) in toto transformation will simply not occur. In either case, cities will depend, for decades, on a ‘hybrid’ public transport system that combines both formal and paratransit operators. This paper presents a case for policy recognition of hybrid systems, and explores how such systems might best be managed. The following categories of hybrid public transport systems are explored through case studies: (1) transformative processes in which paratransit operators are to form or assimilate into companies to operate new services, but this incorporation has proved difficult to complete and the operational and regulatory frameworks remain unchanged; and (2) transformative processes that, from the outset, anticipated a hybrid system and designed the outcome accordingly. A third category of hybrid transport systems, defined as transformative processes that have been amended following a realisation that in toto transformation is unattainable, is also introduced and discussed. The paper concludes by tentatively drawing lessons for appropriate public transport regulation, particularly with respect to Cape Town's transformation project. It is argued that a review of the current national regulatory framework is required to enable possible project modifications that acknowledge system hybridity. It is suggested that regulatory frameworks that accommodate the likely hybrid nature of public transport system outcomes have greater prospects of success than frameworks that do not. Furthermore, it is argued that contextually appropriate and successful public transport transformation projects do not necessarily require the in toto substitution of incumbent paratransit operators, and that they can be integrated with, and complement, formal services.     

Incompleteness and clarity in bus contracts: Identifying the nature of the ex ante and ex post perceptual divide

In the transport sector, many types of contracts exist. Some are very precise, and strive for completeness; others are very ‘light-weight’ and are incomplete. Bus and coach contracts, won through competitive tendering or negotiation, are typically incomplete in the sense of an inability to verify all the relevant obligations, as articulated through a set of deliverables. This paper draws on recent experiences in contract negotiation, and subsequent commitment in the bus sector, to identify what elements of the contracting regime have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal expected, and what the agent believed they were obliged to deliver. We develop a series of regression models to investigate the extent of discrepancy between the principal and the agents perceived ‘understanding’ of contract obligations. The empirical evidence, from a sample of bus operators, is used to identify the extent of perceived incompleteness and clarity across a sample of bus contracts. A noteworthy finding is the important role that a trusting partnership plays in reducing the barriers to establishing greater clarity of contract specification and obligations, and in recognition of the degree of contract completeness.     

Towards a simplified performance-linked value for money model as a reference point for bus contract payments

The burgeoning commitment to contracting the delivery of bus services through competitive tendering or negotiated performance-based contracts has been accompanied by as many contract payments schemes as there are contracts. We are now well placed to design a simplified performance-linked payment (SPLP) model that can be used as a reference point to ensure value for money, given the accumulation of experiences throughout the world which have revealed substantive common elements in contracts. Whether the payment to the operator is framed as a payment per passenger or as a payment per service kilometre, the SPLP identifies efficient subsidy outcomes that are linked to a proxy indicator of net social benefit per dollar of subsidy. We illustrate how the SPLP model can be applied to obtain the gross (subsidy) cost per passenger (or per passenger km) from measures of gross cost efficiency and network effectiveness. This model can then be used as part of a benchmarking activity to identify reference value of money prospects in respect of passengers per $ subsidy outlay by adjusting for influences not under the control of the service provider. A single framework to identify contract payments to operators, and to assess (i.e., benchmark) operator performance on critical KPIs, is provided by internalising critical key performance indicators (KPIs) in the design of the SPLP. The proposed SPLP model is sufficiently general to be independent of the procurement method (competitive tendered or negotiated, for example) and of the treatment of revenue allocation (net or gross based contracts), with the additional advantage of being able to assess value for money for government.     

Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities with different pursuing goals

This paper investigates how landlord port authorities should offer concession contracts to their terminal operators under two different goals, by building a two-stage game for each goal. If maximizing the weighted sum of fee revenues and throughout benefits is port authorities’ goal, then the optimal concession contract can be any of the two-part tariff, the unit-fee, and the fixed-fee contracts. Accordingly, our special cases include previous works assuming that port authorities maximize either fee revenues or throughput benefits. By contrast, if maximizing the social welfare is the goal, then we find that subsidizing terminal operators, instead of charging them, is port authorities’ best choice. This result is not yet discovered in the literature.     

Workshop 4: Designing contracts/concessions: What has worked and what has not and why?: 12th International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport

A contract establishes a mutual relationship between an authority and an operator. From the point of view of the authority, it is a tactical level mechanism to achieve the strategic objectives of government. Management of contractors translate the requirements of contracts into operational practices to guide the day-to-day work of staff for the delivery of services. Much can go wrong with contracts for the provision of public transport services. Workshop participants identified and ranked 25 potential risk factors. The five most important factors, which relate to objectives, tender assessment, allocation of risks, financial viability and dispute management, were examined drawing on the 11 papers presented to the workshop. Matters that work, that do not and would make the most difference to the success of contracts were identified.     

Risk and reward in public transportation contracting

The workshop discusses and documents a number of countries’ experiences regarding risk and reward in the delivery of public transport and determines the way in which competitive pressures actually work (or not) to deliver efficient and effective services. Papers are grouped into three main themes, i.e., public versus private management; negotiated versus competitively tendered contracts; and measures to improve performance. This chapter begins with a brief overview of each of the eight papers. This is followed by a section that out the discussions that emanated from the papers. Finally, the main policy and research recommendations are presented.     

Goal achievement with trusting partnerships at the tactical level

Recent Thredbo Conferences have begun to explore the importance of the relationship between public transport service purchaser and provider in the development of successful public transport services. However, practical examples to test the trusting partnership model are rare. Bus service planning and delivery in Melbourne, Australia, has pioneered the trusting partnership approach, from agreement about desirable service standards and requisite operator qualifications (at the Tactical level) to detailed service delivery contracts. New negotiated performance-based metropolitan bus contracts commenced in January 2009, embodying principles discussed in previous Thredbo Conferences. This paper reports on the Tactical planning process that agreed service standards and the subsequent contract negotiation process, reflecting a trusting partnership between purchaser and provider, while remaining transparent and accountable and maintaining performance pressure on the provider. It shows how patronage growth rates have increased dramatically and identifies areas where further enhancements should be explored in the contracting area.     

To competitively tender or to negotiate - Weighing up the choices in a mature market

A key attribute of competitive tendering for the periodic selection of operators of subsidised public transport services is to secure the provision of specified services at efficient cost levels. This has proved particularly effective where services were previously provided by an inefficient monopoly operator. The arguments for the adoption of competitive tendering in preference to negotiation with the incumbent operator may be less clear-cut in other cases.Consideration is given to both theoretical and practical insights into the relative merits of competitive tendering and negotiation approaches in such situations. The limited literature on the topic is reviewed and insights and lessons identified. Influencing issues include prior conditions, the nature of the supplier market, features of contracts, negotiating and competitive tendering strategies and practice, accountability and transparency, and long-term market implications. The evidence suggests that ‘one size does not fit all’, and the choice will depend on specific circumstances.The relative merits of the two approaches for renewal of bus contracts are considered with regard to Adelaide, for contracts which have previously been awarded through competitive tendering. The paper draws out the main factors that could influence the authority’s choice between the options, and discusses the relevance of the findings to other situations.     

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance.The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county’s role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

How optimal was the Sydney Metro contract?: Comparison with international best practice

The New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro Authority to design, build and operate a completely separate underground Metro rail system to supplement the existing public transport network in Sydney. By the time the NSW government abruptly cancelled the entire Metro project in early 2010, the Authority had conceived and designed a contract that was proceeding to procurement. This paper compares the elements of the proposed Sydney Metro contract to findings of the literature on optimal contracting and optimal incentives and on PPP best practice. The paper concludes that the Metro seems to have at least implicitly drawn fairly heavily on best practices and principles, but that its ultimate failure to be implemented is an instructive lesson about how operating environment can impede integration of useful knowledge and experience.     

Growing patronage - Challenges and what has been found to work

This paper synthesizes evidence on growing public transport patronage. The paper firstly examines barriers to patronage growth before reviewing evidence on endogenous factors (those within the control of operators and regulators) and exogenous factors (those factors such as socio-economic influences which are not controlled by regulators/operators) which affect public transport patronage. Suggested barriers include capacity, network transfers, perceptions and investment/subsidy needs. Evidence is presented suggesting that reliability, service levels and fares are the principal tools to adopt in growing patronage. Car ownership, income and population growth, employment and urban sprawl are amongst the exogenous factors identified as influencing patronage.     

Incorporation of customer satisfaction in public transport contracts – A preliminary analysis

The design of public transport contracts provides an opportunity to define service quality standards to which an operator can be held accountable. While the specification of service quality standards is a common practice, the relationships between the specifications and customer satisfaction are often methodologically unclear. Based on a South African case study, the paper uses data collected from a group of passengers who have personal cars but choose to use public transport, and a control group of passengers who only use their cars, in the same corridor as the user group, to estimate a service quality conjoint model. The model is used to evaluate the effect of different public transport service packages, defined in terms of different combinations of service attributes, on passenger satisfaction. The paper confirms the need to classify service attributes in terms of their relative impact on passenger satisfaction, at the service design stages, where performance in respect of some attributes has a disproportionate impact on satisfaction, especially where public transport is competing directly with private transport. Practical applications and limitations of the methodology are also discussed.     

Workshop 1: Performance measurement and compliance

This workshop discussed challenges of measuring the performance of transport contracts, which is usually achieved by benchmarking the relevant services against a few key performance indicators (KPIs). Such KPIs (the workshop identified cost efficiency, service quality and safety/security as the top three) can be explicitly included in the contracts (with a focus on compliance) or can be rather informal and part of a trusting partnership. Limited availability of good data and appropriate information technology systems appear to be the greatest challenges within developed markets. In the context of creating a formal market (such as the South African taxi market), which encourages public transport measurement and compliance, our findings suggest that it is important to set as a first step minimum standards to address the backlog with respect to establishing performance measurement regimes.     

Equality of bargaining power in contracts for international liner shipping

Mandatory rules exist in contracts for international liner shipping primarily because of imbalances and non-equity in the allocation of contract responsibilities. The superior bargaining position owned by the carriers depends largely upon liner market monopoly levels, the supply and demand balance between the shipper and carrier, and the cargo volume size of the shippers. With the development of shipping technologies, mode of transport, and shipping competition policy, the unequal comparison of bargaining forces between shippers and carriers changes. When the existing mandatory rule was deemed no longer necessary due to changing circumstances, legislation requirements to restore freedom to contract became apparent. When both sides have equal bargaining power, adoption of the principle of freedom of contract for their business relationships is suitable. The Rotterdam Rules concerning freedom of volume contract construction is based on equal bargaining powers between both sides and responds to the evolving situation of the industry. The Rules represent the development trend of today’s theory of contracts for international liner shipping and the demand for legal and institutional changes.     

Competing for level of service in the provision of mobility services: Concepts, processes and measures

One of the most striking problems societies currently deal with is to assure adequate quality standards while improving accessibility within and between cities. In addition there is also a growing awareness that, to achieve a sustainable balance between private and public means of mobility, policies have to be able to send the correct signals in order to induce users adaptive behaviour, which in turn will provide the system with a reliable feedback on the needs for further investment and expansion of transport facilities. The definition and measurement of quality of service of the transport system is thus an objective aimed by both users and producers and it is often represented by the rather holistic concept of Level of Service (LoS). However, the LoS concept is not consciously used by users, on the contrary the user concentrates her comparative evaluation on what is simply known as quality. It is the planner that translates planned quality into LoS concept. So, LoS is a concept at the interface between the provider and the user. Given the interface character of the LoS concept an accounting framework for LoS should thus take into account the need to segregate the evaluation for passengers and freight transport and also distinguish between types of travellers in the case of passenger transport and types of commodities or logistic families in the case of freight transport. Moreover the bridge between the planner and the user view must be ensured. This paper reports the results of a research work dedicated to this topic.     

Ocean shipping deregulation restructures the liner shipping industry

Significant pro-competitive changes were made to the Shipping Act by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA). The most notable of these was the shift away from public tariffs and publicly available contract rates to confidential rates using individually negotiated service contracts. The number of individual member service contracts has risen dramatically since OSRA went into effect in 1999. These statistics support the argument that OSRA was able to bring more competition to the industry. However, the theory and empirical evidence of the Act’s success in improving the performance of the liner industry serving the Transatlantic and Transpacific trade routes, which are two major trunk roads subject to the jurisdiction of the US, are not so compelling. This article employs the theory of joint product to assess the impact of OSRA on the shipping market structure and competition of two major east–west arteries after 1999. This article considers head haul and backhaul container shipments as joint products. Two simple statistical equations are derived to reinterpret Smith’s condition of joint product. The empirical results confirm that the market structure of Transatlantic and Transpacific trade lanes are competitive.