Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

A simulation approach for estimating value at risk in transportation infrastructure investment decisions

Traditional economic analysis techniques used in the assessment of Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects are based upon the assumption that future cash flows are fully deterministic in nature and are not designed to account for risks involved in the assessment of future returns. In reality, many of these infrastructure projects are associated with significant risks stemming from the lack of knowledge about future cost and benefit streams. The fundamental premise of the PPP concept is to efficiently allocate risks between the public and the private partner. The return based on deterministic analysis may not depict a true picture of future economic outcomes of a PPP project for the multiple agencies involved. This deficiency underscores the importance of risk-based economic analysis for such projects. In this paper, the authors present the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) to assess the risk share for the public and private entity in a PPP project. Bootstrap simulation is used to generate the risk profile savings in vehicle operating cost, and in travel time resulting from demand-responsive traffic. The VaR for Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is determined for public and private entity. The methodology is applied to a case study involving such a joint venture in India, the Mumbai Pune Expressway/National Highway 4 (MPEW/NH4), and fiscal implications from the perspective of the public and the private entities are examined. A comparison between deterministic and risk based economic analysis for MPEW/NH4 is presented. Risk analysis provides insightful results on the economic and financial implications from each participant's viewpoint.     

Future challenges for transport infrastructure pricing in PPP arrangements

In this paper we report the conclusion of a research project dedicated to pricing regimes in public-private partnership contracts for the provision of transport infrastructure (Macário et al., 2009). Several elements have been brought to the bulk of knowledge that supports the design and implementation of public-private partnership in the transport sector. These developments have been achieved in the following domain:

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Understand difficulties of price setting within the PPP environment, given the potential conflict of interest among the different parties engaged, go beyond the discussion of first best versus second-best price setting mechanisms.

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Understand the role of government and regulators in the performance of a PPP.

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Translate the issue of asymmetries of information between parties into a risk taking language.

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Devise alternative contractual designs that will enable competitive price setting.

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Understand that a structural element is missing to conciliate the views of the different stakeholders over a PPP: a bridge between infrastructure costs and charges.

The objective of this paper is to overview the main challenges ahead of transport infrastructure pricing, considering the current and likely future policies as well as the field constraints. Moreover, a proposal is formulated to overcome some of the current pitfalls associated to transport infrastructure pricing.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public-private partnerships

The construction and provision of infrastructure services such as transport nowadays is often based on a partnership between three main actors: public sector, private sector and multilateral lenders, under a framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). This type of partnership has been employed in a wide range of projects in the transport sector and in various contexts in developing and developed countries. Given this observation, the objective of this paper is to examine how countries’ economic and political characteristics contribute to the success of PPPs in transport investments. Special focus in the analysis is given to how the perception of corruption and democratic accountability may influence the success of a PPP project in different transport sectors. We examine a database with 856 transport PPP projects using a generalized linear model in the form of a logit model in order to evaluate the transport database covering data from 72 countries, classified in six regions. The study highlights the importance of national experience. Not only does national macroeconomic experience appear to have a relevant role, but so also does its past experience (either positive or negative) of transport PPP projects. An interesting finding from the analysis is the importance of the rest of the world’s perception of a country’s level of corruption and democratic accountability for the final outcome of a PPP project.     

Transport infrastructure provision and operations: Why should governments choose private–public partnership?

Recent transport sector liberalisation, as well as global economic crisis, is favouring the implementation of transport infrastructure projects through Public–Private Partnerships (PPP). However, there is a debate as to whether PPP schemes are a better option than conventional procurement. To this end, an evaluation framework is proposed, to assess which of these two alternative schemes for transport projects financing is preferable for the public. The proposed framework is complimentary to the Value for Money (VfM) approach and is based on a Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). The first step is the estimation of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) for the case of conventional procurement, dealing with construction, maintenance and operation costs revenues, as well as any costs associated with risks undertaken by the public. As for the PPP case, it includes any payments by the public sector and related risks costs. The MCA is then applied only if the PPP is found preferable for the public sector. The latter considers additional impacts, including among others the social attributes of a particular scheme, job creation, environmental impacts and safety and security aspects. The proposed framework was applied to a pilot Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor infrastructure project in the city of Indore, India, in order to demonstrate its validity. The framework and its application could provide useful guidance when considering PPP for a transport project, since it demonstrates in a transparent way the society's attitude towards this project, something that is critical to its acceptance.     

Multi-criteria analysis of decision-making by international commercial banks for providing shipping loans

This research investigates the underwriting attitude of international commercial banks in lending shipping loans. By adopting the analytic hierarchical process methodology, the underwriting attitude is captured to understand how bankers would deal with shipping loans in response to the current lengthy recession. We find that bankers focus on the criteria of corporate recourse (CR) in their decision-makings. Of the CR factors, the financial strength of shipowner is the most important factor, followed by the shipowner’s business history and the bank–firm relationship. With the current underwriting attitude, the shipping sector may have limited access to shipping loans of international commercial banks due to low corporate ratings caused by the long recession and the nature of industry itself: volatility, fragmentation, capital intensity, high leverage, etc.     

Tips and Pitfalls in PPP design

The Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) procedure is a very appealing model, but as it becomes more and more used in practice, problems and failures have been observed in the management of many projects. Many of these unfortunate experiences are consequences of errors in the implementation of the procedure, but in other cases, clear errors of conception were the cause.Indeed, there are many ways to structure a PPP and PPP is not the only way to manage an infrastructure scheme. It is thus an important task to provide guidelines on whether to use PPP or other types of procurement and, in case a PPP is preferred, on how to design it. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to this task, trying to combine theoretical knowledge and practical experience.After a review of the variety of economic characteristics of transport infrastructure and their procurement conditions, we recall the reasons that may justify this association of public and private management which is the characteristic of PPP, outlining the limits of using pure private or pure public procurement. Then an analytic process is proposed, screening the parameters which matter most for choosing the PPP procedure among many possible ones, depending on the specificities of the various transport modes. This process gives also indications on key elements for implementing a PPP.Finally, the analytic process proposed is used for a generic analysis of, respectively, the motorways and port sectors, so as to test its practicability and customizing capability for the use of public authorities.     

Alternative financing for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): The case of Porto Alegre, Brazil

In the 1970s, Brazil was leading the implementation of high-flow bus priority schemes, but now cities are less capable of financing public infrastructures. This paper explores the private sector participation in the provision of transit infrastructure based on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The Porto Alegre BRT contemplates interchange terminals planned to accommodate retail and service activities. It is expected that these areas shall generate enough revenues to remunerate private investors, under a PPP scheme, for the construction of terminals and part of the infrastructure required to upgrade some sections of the existing busways to BRT standards.     

A strategic model of public–private partnerships in transportation: Effect of taxes and cost structure on investment viability

We formulate a game-theoretic model of a concession agreement between a government and a private party, a concessionaire, who has to engage a set of service providers as part of the operating responsibilities. We use the model to examine the importance of a government's tax policy to induce private investments in transportation infrastructure. Our analysis brings to fore insights that are useful in the design of partnership agreements, such as the importance of early and binding government commitments to ensure stable partnerships, and thus, successful projects. Our analysis shows that these strong commitments are even more critical in situations where the success of the partnership requires participation of additional, self-interested parties, such as specialized service providers. Finally, we consider variations of the model where government preferences are explicitly captured, and where the returns from the fixed cost portion of the concessionaire's investment are exempt from taxes. We show that both variations can lead to outcomes where the concessionaire's tax burden is shifted to the service providers. This flexibility can be critical in the design of partnership agreements for (high-risk or highly specialized transportation) projects where additional incentives may be needed to induce private party participation.     

Evaluation of progress in contractual terms: Two case studies of recent DBFO PPP projects in North America

With continuous demand for transportation infrastructure and chronic funding shortfalls, public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure provision have garnered attention in recent years in the U.S. and abroad. High profile concession deals in Chicago and Indiana have raised concerns about the protection of public interests in PPPs. Such concerns have ignited heated debates, partly driven by ideology and vested interests, but also by questionable decisions made previously. While public agencies at all levels are interested in identifying successful PPP arrangements, the variety and complexity of PPP deals, combined with local factors unique to each project, make the development of a universal evaluation framework practically infeasible.     

国际某港口PPP/BOT项目招标文件案例分析

采用文本分析方法,对国际某港口项目招标文件进行分析,以帮助国际PPP/BOT项目投标人做出恰当的投标决策。分析内容包括:项目背景、招标程序、招标文件的组成、投标要求、风险分担。分析结果表明,该招标的时间安排比较仓促,不能满足投标人投标所需要的时间;招标文件的组成不够完善,没有提供投标人投标重要依据的项目特许权协议草案;项目投标要求的编制比较清晰,但涉及项目风险分担的规定比较笼统模糊,而且让特许权受让人承担法律、政策变更的风险不尽合理。认为,由于国际PPP/BOT项目具有前期沉没成本高的特点,投标者应在研究招标文件的基础上,采取"以我为主"的投标策略,设定投标的底线,并将其在投标书中体现出来,这样才能更好地实现投资国际PPP/BOT项目的目标。     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

Applying social marginal costs pricing to the road sector

This chapter, following the results of the case studies analyzed in the Enact project, will identify and analyze the implications of the possible application of SMCP in PPP’s in the road sector. The main issues analyzed include SMCP revenue formation and its ability to finance the PPP. The paper will focus on market and competition issues like: 1) the problems due to mispriced substitutes; 2) the interdependencies between the tolls and the capacity of different road infrastructures when these are competing for the same demand; 3) since short run social marginal costs do not repay for the investments costs (except in special cases), in the case tolls should cover also the investment costs this will lead to totally different pricing schemes between roads in a same area, with problem of demand shift toward cheaper existing infrastructures, therefore increasing the problem of cost recovery. The incentives caused by the introduction of prices based on SMC’s are also investigated.     

Workshop 4: Designing contracts/concessions: What has worked and what has not and why?: 12th International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport

A contract establishes a mutual relationship between an authority and an operator. From the point of view of the authority, it is a tactical level mechanism to achieve the strategic objectives of government. Management of contractors translate the requirements of contracts into operational practices to guide the day-to-day work of staff for the delivery of services. Much can go wrong with contracts for the provision of public transport services. Workshop participants identified and ranked 25 potential risk factors. The five most important factors, which relate to objectives, tender assessment, allocation of risks, financial viability and dispute management, were examined drawing on the 11 papers presented to the workshop. Matters that work, that do not and would make the most difference to the success of contracts were identified.     

Quality incentives and quality outcomes in procured public transport - Case study Stockholm

Gross contracts appear to be the most common contract form for procured public transport in Sweden and elsewhere. This contract form, it has been argued, gives weak incentives for operators to deliver the desired quality level. Therefore many procuring public transport authorities amend contracts with quality incentives.This paper examines how such quality incentives influence quality outcomes with focus on cancelled departures and delays. The main findings are that the introduction of quality incentives are correlated with both increases and decreases of measured quality outcomes.We hypothesise that the results are driven by underlying cost changes for achieving desired quality objectives that exceed the possible revenues from the incentives. In interviews with the Stockholm public transport authority (SL) and some operators, two central observations surface. The first is that there are causes for quality failures that are not solely the responsibility of operators and that these are therefore not fully reached by the incentives, and the second is that the operators believe that they have exhausted what they can do under the current contracts.     

The potential role of public–private partnerships in the upgrade of port infrastructure: normative and positive considerations

There is a broad consensus on the need for the major expansion of many ports. Traditionally, ports and related facilities have involved significant levels of direct or indirect government ownership or some degree of government financing. Most governments, however, are reluctant to either borrow money to fund the needed additional capital infrastructure or to fund it directly. Public–private partnerships (P3s) are thus an attractive potential option. But are they the answer? This article examines the normative rationales for P3s and presents a positive theory perspective that focuses on the conflicting goals of public and private partners. It argues that the major government impetus for P3s is likely to be for physical port infrastructure with moderate levels of market failure, such as small to medium sized ports, and not for intangible port activities. Furthermore, small to medium sized port P3s are likely to be successful in terms of having relatively low transaction costs and lower total social costs than alternative provision mechanisms. Nonetheless, even in this situation, the different goals of public and private partners may give rise to conflict. Drawing on the global empirical evidence on P3s, this article proposes some institutional design features that will help to ensure P3 success.     

Risk and reward in rail contracting

This workshop considered the role of risks and rewards in rail transport by considering evidence on the impacts of industry structure, franchising and infrastructure charges. A schema for the allocation of risks and rewards was developed, which indicated that strategic risks should be borne by authorities and operational risks by operators, but that tactical risks were more difficult to allocate and appropriate reward mechanisms more difficult to design. The extent to which these difficulties can be addressed by competitive tendering and alternatives such as trusting partnerships and negotiated performance based contracts was considered.     

Equality of bargaining power in contracts for international liner shipping

Mandatory rules exist in contracts for international liner shipping primarily because of imbalances and non-equity in the allocation of contract responsibilities. The superior bargaining position owned by the carriers depends largely upon liner market monopoly levels, the supply and demand balance between the shipper and carrier, and the cargo volume size of the shippers. With the development of shipping technologies, mode of transport, and shipping competition policy, the unequal comparison of bargaining forces between shippers and carriers changes. When the existing mandatory rule was deemed no longer necessary due to changing circumstances, legislation requirements to restore freedom to contract became apparent. When both sides have equal bargaining power, adoption of the principle of freedom of contract for their business relationships is suitable. The Rotterdam Rules concerning freedom of volume contract construction is based on equal bargaining powers between both sides and responds to the evolving situation of the industry. The Rules represent the development trend of today’s theory of contracts for international liner shipping and the demand for legal and institutional changes.     

对我国水路基础设施投融资政策的分析与调整

随着社会经济的快速发展，水路交通基础设施相对落后的状况与水路交通运输大发展需求之间的矛盾仍然存在。根据实际发展情况变化，分析研究现行水路交通基础设施投融资政策，明确政策凋整的依据和条件，并对国家相关政策提出调整建议和具体的实施措施，对于充分发挥水路交通在国民经济发展中的作用很有必要。通过凋研提出了增加国家财政投资、鼓励多渠道投资、创新融资方式和发挥地方政府投资的积极性等政策建议。