Robust password and smart card based authentication scheme with smart card revocation

User authentication scheme allows user and server to authenticate each other, and generates a session key for the subsequent communication. How to resist the password guessing attacks and smart card stolen attacks are two key problems for designing smart cart and password based user authentication scheme. In 2011, Li and Lee proposed a new smart cart and password based user authentication scheme with smart card revocation, and claimed that their scheme could be immunity to these attacks. In this paper, we show that Li and Lee＇s sctleme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack once the information stored in smart card is extracted, and it does not provide perfect forward secrecy. A robust user authentication scheme with smart card revocation is then proposed. We use a most popular and widely used formal verification tool ProVerif, which is based on applied pi calculus, to prove that the proposed scheme achieves security and authentication.     

Threshold signature scheme with threshold verification based on multivariate linear polynomial

Secret sharing schemes are multi-party protocols related to key establishment. They also facilitate distributed trust or shared control for critical activities (e.g., signing corporate cheques and opening bank vaults), by gating the critical action on cooperation from t(t ∈ Z ⁺) of n(n ∈ Z ⁺) users. A (t, n) threshold scheme (t < n) is a method by which a trusted party computes secret shares Γ _i (1 ⩽ i ⩽ n) from an initial secret Γ ₀ and securely distributes Γ _i to user. Any t or more users who pool their shares may easily recover Γ ₀, but any group knowing only t−1 or fewer shares may not. By the ElGamal public key cryptophytes and the Schnorr’s signature scheme, this paper proposes a new (t, n) threshold signature scheme with (k,m) (k,m ∈ Z ⁺) threshold verification based on the multivariate linear polynomial.