建筑工程质量监控的博弈分析

围绕建筑工程质量监控，运用博弈论基本原理，对建设商和承包商各自的行为建立模型进行分析，得出加大惩罚力度可以有效控制工程质量的结论。     

企业竞争中的最小赢得联盟

给出了企业竞争中的最小赢得联盟S，证明了不在S中、成员利益为0的企业的集合Vs的稳定性。从战略联盟的规模、联盟成员企业的分配比例、成员企业的机会主义行为以及成员退出后的利益补偿等方面对Vs进行了分析，并用实例予以说明。联盟并不等于垄断，调整企业资源既使企业受惠也增进了消费者的社会福利。     

Possibility of Strategic Alliance from Competition： A Game Analysis

The possibility for two competitive firms to form a strategic alliance was quantitatively analyzed with the game theory. The strategic alliance could be formed in an infinitely repeated game with complete information or a finitely repeated game with incomplete information. In the former situation, the discount ratio is important. If the discount ratio is large enough, alliance would be a possible solution. In the latter situation, the bigger the possibility of the rationality is, the more possible is for both firms to make strategic alliance.