Remuneration models and revenue risk mitigation in road public–private partnership projects – a case study from Serbia

As a consequence of renewed interest in attracting private financing for infrastructure investments, public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements are mostly seen as a suitable mechanism for ensuring sound and quicker delivery of transport infrastructure projects. However, a general concern is that expectations of mobilizing private-sector funds have been overestimated in a number of cases. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the risk analysis of transport PPP projects with substantial exogenous demand risk which could serve as a rationale for choosing the appropriate PPP model. The objective of this paper is to construct an analytical cash flow-based project model to facilitate the choice of the remuneration mechanism suitable for both private investors and public sector. The model provides an indication whether the project should be implemented as a ‘users pay’, a hybrid or an ‘annuity’ PPP model. The proposed methodology is illustrated using a case study from Serbia.     

A cost performance analysis of transport infrastructure construction in Slovenia

Due to limited data availability only a few studies have been able to provide statistically significant evidence on cost overruns in transport infrastructure investments and their systematic nature, and fewer still for road infrastructure investments. The body of available evidence refers to the most economically developed countries, while very little evidence was found regarding other countries. In this article the authors focus on cost performance of road infrastructure constructed through the National Motorway Construction Programme in Slovenia. Methodologically the study departs from other studies in this field by building on detailed expenditure data and not aggregate reports from the relevant institution. This enabled the analysis of four individual project cost categories (construction cost, land acquisition damages and others) and comparably more accurate results. A representative sample of randomly selected completed projects in the period 1995–2007 revealed that the cost overruns (19%; SD = 46.10%) in the entire period studied do not appear to be higher than in other comparable studies. At the same time the study results showed that cost overruns were unstable, i.e. much higher for older projects.     

Risk pricing inefficiency in public–private partnerships*

There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public–private partnership (PPP) rather than traditional public procurement. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests in the cost of financing and their efficiency in delivery and operation. This paper focuses on the cost of financing, in particular the cost associated with transferring risk from the public to private sphere. If capital markets were efficient and complete, the cost of public (government) and private financing should be the same, with the relative delivery and operational efficiency remaining as the primary determinant of value-for-money. Evidence suggests, however, that the risk transfer to a PPP entails an inefficient risk pricing premium which goes beyond the direct cost of financing. We argue that a high price for PPPs results from large risk transfers, risk treatment within the private sector, and uncertainty around the past and future performance of public–private consortia. The corollary is that the efficiency gains from a PPP must be much higher than commonly expected to deliver a greater value for the money than under a traditional approach.     

Renegotiating PPP Contracts: Reinforcing the ‘P' in Partnership

Abstract

The issue of renegotiation is becoming increasingly important as a tool to address uncertainty of public private partnership (PPP) projects and as a mechanism to restore its economic and financial equilibrium. This paper aims to understand how and why renegotiations occur in long-lasting PPP projects and what are the pros and cons of the renegotiation. We depart from a literature review on contract incompleteness and on the determinant factors for the renegotiation of infrastructure concessions. To illustrate the discussion, the case studies of nine European PPP projects are analysed by examining the specific exogenous and endogenous determinant factors that conduce to renegotiating contracts. The implications of contractual renegotiations are explained and summarized through a comparison of our case studies with literature. Although renegotiation, per se, is not a solution for the successful implementation of PPP projects, our findings reinforce the idea of contractual flexibility as a tool that allows adapting to uncertainty. Moreover, effective communication mechanisms allow a better response to unforeseen events, reinforcing the partners’ commitment to deliver a win–win project.     

The location of public logistic centers: an expanded capacity-limited fixed cost location-allocation modeling approach

The location problem considered in this paper concerns the optimal number, size, and location of public logistic centers. To solve this problem, a mathematical model is developed based on an expanded capacity-limited fixed cost location-allocation model of a network incorporating handling costs and the costs of the temporary storage of cargo in the logistic center. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is evaluated with a numerical example of locating public logistic centers of international importance in the Republic of Serbia, based on two scenarios regarding the future development of import cargo flows into the Republic to the year 2020.