基于组合拍卖与统一价格的停车位最优分配研究

考虑停车服务平台同时提供预约和即到即停两类停车模式，建立基于组合拍卖与统一价格的停车位最优分配整数规划模型，实现最大化竞标者与平台的整体效用。将长期停留在以竞价分配为目标的传统拍卖机制拓展为竞价分配与统一价格分配相结合的新式单边 VickreyClarke-Groves(O-VCG)组合拍卖机制，对预约与即到即停模式进行最优分配与定价，同时保证了激励相容、个体理性及配置效率这3个重要属性。通过算例分析，探讨了竞标者的出价分布、竞标者人数对两类模式停车分配策略及整体效用的影响。结果表明，当竞标者对单个停车时段出价的均值与单个停车时段的统一价格接近时，O-VCG组合拍卖机制能够实现两类停车模式的最优分配和系统鲁棒性。

Optimal Parking Space Allocation Based on Combinatorial Auction and Uniform Price

This paper considers a parking service platform that provides two types of parking modes simultaneously: reservation mode and first-come- first-served mode. An optimal integer programming model is proposed to maximize the overall utility of bidders and the platform. The uniform price is introduced into a one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) combinatorial auction mechanism. The proposed novel O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism helps to achieve the goals of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and allocative efficiency. The numerical study demonstrates the effects of the bid distribution and bidder quantity on the parking allocation strategy and the overall utility of the two modes. The results indicate that when the average value of bids is close to the uniform price of single parking time slot, the O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism can realize the optimal allocation of the two types of parking modes and ensure the system robustness.