中马港口合作驶入快车道

正7月13日,中马港口联盟第一次会谈在宁波召开。此次会谈是继去年年底中马两国交通部长在两国总理见证下签署港口联盟合作谅解备忘录后的第一次全体联盟成员聚会,对于两国港口发展具有标志性意义。此次会谈以"携手开创中马港口联盟合作发展新局面"为主题,意在共襄两国港口合作发展盛举。     

港口竞争合作策略的演化博弈分析

为了研究港口之间长期的竞争合作关系，在完全信息条件下的竞争合作静态博弈模型基础上，采用演化博弈的理论方法，分析了港口竞争合作长期演变发展的趋势。研究表明，港口之间长期竞争合作演化的均衡结果可能是完全竞争或完全合作；在一定的信息引导机制下，港口收敛于哪一个均衡点受到博弈发生的初始状态影响；     

借鉴欧美港口经验探讨我国港口联盟的实现

针对目前各国港口间过度竞争的情况,说明了港口之间建立联盟的必要性.在借鉴欧美港口合作经验的基础上,对我国的港口联盟进行了探讨,特别分析了不同区域的港口群在构建战略联盟时所应注意的方面.最后指出了未来研究的方向.     

港口竞争合作策略的演化博弈分析

为了研究港口之间长期的竞争合作关系,在完全信息条件下的竞争合作静态博弈模型基础上,采用演化博弈的理论方法,分析了港口竞争合作长期演变发展的趋势.研究表明,港口之间长期竞争合作演化的均衡结果是完全竞争或完全合作;在一定的信息引导机制下,港口收敛于哪一个均衡点受到博弈发生的初始状态的影响;从何路径最后达到何种状态与港口间的服务替代率密切相关.     

同一条江 共同发展 第二届西江港口合作发展论坛取得重大成果

<正> 呼吁推动形成省部协调机制促西江航运发展达成共识共同呼吁将西江黄金水道纳入"十二五"计划作为2010年中国航海日珠江片区庆祝活动的重要内容,以"同一条江,共同发展"为主题的第二届西江港口合作发展论坛暨西江港口联盟年也同日隆重举行。珠海市副市长赵建国、珠江航务管理局副局长祁军辉、西江沿江各市政府领导以及珠海港控股集团董事长、西江港口联盟理事长杨润贵、港航企业代表等100多人参加了会议。     

现代港航物流的发展趋势——港航企业合作联盟化

在阐述班轮运输企业横向合作联盟——航运联盟的演变及发展的基础上，从联盟力度、运力情况、货主的选择等3个方面分析P3网络联盟对航运市场造成的影响。班轮运输企业与港口之间纵向合作联盟的发展趋势表现为：班轮运输企业具有港航合作联盟的主动权；拥有深水良港的码头运营商具有竞争优势；未掌握运力的国际港口经营商处境艰难。在竞争与合作的时代，港航企业应集成一体化共建全球物流服务网络，提高港航企业整体竞争力。     

携手谋发展共创新商机把西江港口合作推向新高度

珠江水系西江港口联盟成立三年来,在有关部门和沿江沿岸各地政府企业的高度重视和大力支持下,成功构建起一个新兴的区域经济合作平台,打造出一条高效、便捷、经济的水上物流大通道,为流域经济发展做出了重要贡献,取得阶段性成果:一是合作的层次不断提升;二是西江流域物流体系建设全面提升;三是西江航道畅通工程不断取得突破;四是西江流域港口间的合作模式不断创新、合作内容不断深化;五是西江港口联盟队伍不断壮大;六是西江港口联盟的信息、文化建设不断加快.截止2012年年底,计划新增内河港口吞吐能力超过7000万吨,总吞吐能力达到1亿吨以上,基本建成贵港至梧州2000吨级航道、右江1000吨级航道、柳江黔江500吨级航道、桂平二线船闸,进一步提升西江水运整体通过能力,亿吨级黄金水道初步形成.     

中国集装箱港口合作竞争的博弈分析

经济全球化导致了中国集装箱港口之间的激烈竞争,我们从博弈分析角度通过对所构建的博弈模型的重复博弈分析,提出集装箱港口之间合作竞争的理念,阐明中国集装箱港口之间合作竞争是可能与必然的。     

上海和宁波-舟山港竞争合作的博弈分析

在完全信息条件下的竞争合作博弈模型基础上,分析了上海港和宁波-舟山港竞争合作的发展趋势,研究表明:合作-合作策略是上海港和宁渡-舟山港的最优选择,也是一种共赢结果;在服务替代率不是很大,但也不是很小时,若要使两个港口的总收益进一步增加,必须建立一定的利益分配原则.     

基于博弈模型的福建三大港口联盟分析

为寻找福建省港口联盟的发展方向、谋求更好的效益,梳理福建港口发展历程及港口联盟方式,基于合作博弈论分别建立双方博弈和三方博弈模型。双方博弈模型使用斯塔克尔伯格(Stackelberg)模型,三方博弈模型借助因子分析法分析城市综合实力和港口自身实力。结果表明:福建省港口联盟的最佳方式为三方联盟,其收益大于任意一港或两港联盟的收益。建议:建立福建港口联盟,适时促进合作并逐步考虑引导合并;改变专业码头建设过剩的情况,需要对港口群的条块分割局势进行充分利用,促进市场要素自由流动的同时引导港口集中发展优势项目以形成互补格局;鼓励港口发展特色业务;促进港航合作和港路合作以发展港区企业,解决临港企业发展缓慢的问题。     

A conceptual application of cooperative game theory to liner shipping strategic alliances

Since its advent, the liner shipping industry has been characterized by fierce competition and cooperation amongst the member carriers. In recent years, almost all the liners have sought extensive cooperation with others, as reflected mainly by the formation of strategic shipping alliances. Despite this, there are still some liners who prefer the 'go-it-alone' policy and have achieved relative success. It seems that cooperation is not always necessary for a liner company's success. It follows that a study that aims to find the rationale behind liner cooperation (or non-cooperation) is of great significance. Over many years of development, game theory has proved to be a useful tool in the study of economics. It is analytically applicable in this market. With these arguments in mind, this paper aims to apply cooperative game theory to analyse co-operation among members of liner shipping strategic alliances. This will involve: (i) presenting a detailed and systematic analysis of liner shipping strategic alliances: (ii) a concise overview of the development of game theory with specific focus on cooperative game theory, and (iii) deducing a conceptual framework through the application of cooperative game theory to liner shipping strategic alliances. The accomplishment of the aforementioned objectives will enhance understanding of inter-organizational relationships and decision-making behaviour in the liner shipping sector.     

港口群系统的竞争合作与演变发展

阐述港口群系统从港口地域组合到港口运输体系的演变发展过程,形成各个港口地域组合之间既相互竞争又相互合作的关系,从而建立港口群系统整体发展的评价指标。通过对港口之间的协商博弈模型的分析,提出了有序管理港口群资源的运作模式。     

港口码头重复建设的博弈分析

通过建立两个码头之间的完全信息静态博弈模型和完全信息动态博弈模型分析了港口码头的重复建设现象。认为重复建设的根本原因在于各个港口对经济腹地的预测值偏高,港口之间缺乏协调合作,以致于在竞争中产生一种类似“囚徒困境”的心理。本文给出了解决港口码头重复建设问题的若干政策建议。     

Analysis of the development potential of bulk shipping network on the Yangtze River

In the past decades, a multilayer transshipment network of bulk shipping has been formed along the Yangtze River so as to support the fast development of Chinese iron and steel industry. Yet with the decrease of iron ore trade in China since 2014, the bulk port system on Yangtze River probably will be subject to change in the future. Under this background, this paper aims to analyze the development potential of Yangtze River bulk ports system with a focus on iron ore transshipment. To realize this objective, we firstly sort out the main transshipment patterns of bulk shipping, and optimize the bulk-shipping network with an optimization model. Several scenarios are then proposed and examined in the model by changing corresponding parameters. Cooperation among ports as one scenario is analyzed by applying core theory in cooperative game. Based on the changes of transshipment plans observed under the various scenarios, we finally ascertain the different development potentials of the system, and provide suggestions to the port operators and local maritime authorities.     

Evaluating determinants of attractiveness and their cause-effect relationships for container ports in Taiwan: users’ perspectives

The attractiveness of ports is usually a pre-requisite and necessary condition for ports to achieve competitiveness, as well as the springboard to explore the competitive advantages of ports. To determine whether a port is competitive, it is necessary to explore whether it boasts certain factors that make the port attractive to users. The main purpose of this article is to apply the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method and the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) technique to evaluate key determinants of attractiveness and their cause/effect relationships for container ports in Taiwan. The empirical results showed that: (1) Top six determinates of attractiveness for container ports are ‘ample cargo sources,’ ‘favorable port charges,’ ‘dense ship network and routes,’ ‘low transshipment costs,’ ‘efficient wharf operations,’ and ‘adequate wharfs and back-line land,’ respectively. (2) Among the above six determinants of attractiveness, ‘ample cargo sources’ is the cause determinant. Three determinants of port attractiveness, ‘favorable port charges,’ ‘dense ship network and routes,’ ‘low transshipment costs,’ which are the effect determinants. They are affected by the determinants of attractiveness of ‘ample cargo sources’. In addition, this study discusses the above findings and expects to provide the study results to Taiwan’s port authorities for reference.     

两岸“三通”后闽台港口合作发展展望

运用SWOT分析方法,指出闽台两地港口共建的优势和劣势,机遇和面临的强大挑战.提出了两地当务之急是要建立港口战略合作沟通机制,深度整合双方港口资源,研究突破双方开展港口合作的制度障碍,加大两地临港工业和港口物流建设的力度,不断加强双方的港口货物集疏运系统建设,增加对腹地货源的吸引力.     

A conceptual application of cooperative game theory to liner shipping strategic alliances

Since its advent, the liner shipping industry has been characterized by fierce competition and cooperation amongst the member carriers. In recent years, almost all the liners have sought extensive cooperation with others, as reflected mainly by the formation of strategic shipping alliances. Despite this, there are still some liners who prefer the ‘go-it-alone’ policy and have achieved relative success. It seems that cooperation is not always necessary for a liner company's success. It follows that a study that aims to find the rationale behind liner cooperation (or non-cooperation) is of great significance. Over many years of development, game theory has proved to be a useful tool in the study of economics. It is analytically applicable in this market. With these arguments in mind, this paper aims to apply cooperative game theory to analyse co-operation among members of liner shipping strategic alliances. This will involve: (i) presenting a detailed and systematic analysis of liner shipping strategic alliances: (ii) a concise overview of the development of game theory with specific focus on cooperative game theory, and (iii) deducing a conceptual framework through the application of cooperative game theory to liner shipping strategic alliances. The accomplishment of the aforementioned objectives will enhance understanding of inter-organizational relationships and decision-making behaviour in the liner shipping sector.     

Competition model of cruise home ports based on the cruise supply chain – based on China cruise market

This paper addresses issues of cruise home port competition based on the cruise supply chain. A pricing model of the cruise market is developed considering the competitive cooperation behaviors of the participants in the cruise supply chain. Furthermore, a model of cruise home port competition is developed to investigate the impacts of subsidy participants in the cruise supply chain on cruise home ports. The results indicate that subsidy policies change the market equilibrium, promote the upstream and downstream integration of cruise supply chain, and enhance cruise home port competitiveness. Subsidies to cruise line increase the payoffs of cruise supply chain and ports’ profit. Subsidies to travel agency decrease passenger costs and improve all ports’ profits. For the long-term development of cruise home port, the consequents can be used as policy suggestions.     

A game theory analysis of port specialization—implications to the Chinese port industry

The fast growth of the Chinese economy and its international seaborne trade has escalated the demand for high-quality and efficient port services. “Decentralization” of the port management regime has given local government greater freedom in port development and operational decision-making. However, major port capacity expansion in coastal areas, coupled with the slowing down of both the economy and trade growth over recent years, has led to overcapacity and excessive competition. Although both port specialization and government regulations are called for to address these issues, few studies have investigated the formation mechanism and economic implications of port specialization. This paper uses alternative duopoly games, namely a Stackelberg game and a simultaneous game, to model port competition, where ports provide differentiated services in the sectors of containerized cargo and dry-bulk cargo. Our analytical results reveal that inter-port competition can lead to port specialization in the following three ways. A port can specialize in a type of cargo (1) for which there is relatively high demand, (2) where it has established capacity first, or (3) for services which require prohibitively high capacity costs. Also, it is seen that overcapacity is likely if strategic port decisions are made simultaneously instead of sequentially. These results suggest that if there is a clear market leader, policy intervention may not be necessary. However, if no port has clear market power, then government coordination and intervention may be needed in order to prevent overcapacity and to encourage specialization.     

A game-theoretical approach for modeling competitions in a maritime supply chain

ABSTRACT

To accommodate the structural changes in logistics, competitions along a maritime supply chain are more intensive than before. This paper adopts a two-stage noncooperative game-theoretical approach to model the horizontal and vertical interactions among liners and ports. In the first stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the interactions between two liners. When the shipping line decides which port to call, a multinomial Logit model is applied. In the second stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the competitions between two ports. Nash equilibrium is derived by solving the Bertrand games. A numerical example is provided as a case study.