Comparing operator and users costs of light rail, heavy rail and bus rapid transit over a radial public transport network

A model to compare three alternative forms of public transport - light rail, heavy rail and bus rapid transit - is developed for an urban network with radial lines emanating from the borders to the city centre. The theoretical framework assumes an operation aimed at minimising the total cost associated with public transport service provision, which encompasses both operator and users costs. The decision variables are the number of lines (network density) and the frequency per period for each mode. This approach has no prejudices a priori in respect of whether a specified delivery scenario is aligned with existing modal reputation. Rather, we establish the conditions under which a specific transit mode should be preferred to another in terms of the operator (supply) and user (demand) side offerings. The model is applied using data from Australian cities, suggesting that in most of the scenarios analysed a high standard bus service is the most cost-effective mode, because it provides lower operator costs (infrastructure, rolling stock and operating cost), access time costs (due to a larger number of lines) and waiting time cost (due to larger frequencies of operation). A rail mode, such as light rail or heavy rail, may have a lower total cost only if it is able to run faster than bus rapid transit, and the difference in speed is enough to outweigh the bus advantage on operator cost and access and waiting times.     

Influential factors in the design of port infrastructure tariffs

ABSTRACT

The main aim of this article is to examine the factors influential to the practical process of port infrastructure tariff design. The analysis is based on the survey data of 67 seaports representing the Australasian, East Asian, European, North American and South American regions. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was first carried out to identify the factors influential to the selection of the infrastructure tariff design model. Subsequently, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to confirm the relationship between the variables. The findings showed that demand, knowledge about pricing theories, the dynamics of port and shipping sectors (including competition and ship size), pricing objectives and port cost consideration are influential factors in infrastructure tariff design. Most ports use a mix of pricing approaches including price discrimination, cost-based pricing and market-based pricing. Ports are aware of the basic pricing approaches but have limited knowledge of their application. Based on the results of analysis, policy implications for port management in designing port infrastructure tariffs, limitations and recommendations for future research are discussed.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

A Bayesian model to assess rail track geometry degradation through its life-cycle

One of the major drawbacks in rail track investments is the high level of uncertainty in maintenance, renewal and unavailability costs for the Infrastructure Managers (IM) during the life-cycle of the infrastructure. Above all, rail track geometry degradation is responsible for the greatest part of railway infrastructure maintenance costs. Some approaches have been tried to control the uncertainty associated with rail track geometry degradation at the design stage, though little progress has improved the investors' confidence. Moreover, many studies on rail track life-cycle cost modelling tend to forget the dynamic perspective in uncertainty assessments and do not quantify the expected reduction of the uncertainty associated with degradation parameters as more inspection data is collected after operation starts.     

The funding of hierarchical railway development in China

Transport networks are hierarchal in essence. In this paper, we explore the relationship between the financing structure and the hierarchal evolution of railway network development, using the case of China. Although privatization and corporatization in transport provision have been trends in some parts of the world, the national government is still the main body responsible for railway development in many countries. Among these countries, China and India are the only two that include the Ministry of Railways (MOR). In India, the entire country's railways are clearly defined as public services provided and managed by the MOR. In China, railways have been corporatized; yet, the MOR and the National Railway Corporation are still widely regarded as a single body that has monopolistic power over almost all railway systems at the national and regional levels in both infrastructure development and operation.     

Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs

The development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price.We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce.One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll.In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue.In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project:

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when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll;

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when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately;

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when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government.

Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing.

Preamble

Most of the theoretical studies devoted to optimising public investment programming and infrastructure pricing have, since the work of Jules Dupuit (1844), focused on the salient issues of the transport sector, even though this work was relevant to all sorts of public infrastructure. The analysis presented in this paper deals with transport economics, but in line with this tradition, is also applicable to any field in which public-funding is combined with commercial revenue. For example, the question of determining how the financing of an opera should be shared between taxpayers and opera-goers raises the same type of issues as the optimal combination of tolls and subsidies for financing a motorway project. This report will be focused on these issues. We shall see that certain precautions are called for in investment programming together with some new thinking on pricing principles.     

Applying social marginal costs pricing to the road sector

This chapter, following the results of the case studies analyzed in the Enact project, will identify and analyze the implications of the possible application of SMCP in PPP’s in the road sector. The main issues analyzed include SMCP revenue formation and its ability to finance the PPP. The paper will focus on market and competition issues like: 1) the problems due to mispriced substitutes; 2) the interdependencies between the tolls and the capacity of different road infrastructures when these are competing for the same demand; 3) since short run social marginal costs do not repay for the investments costs (except in special cases), in the case tolls should cover also the investment costs this will lead to totally different pricing schemes between roads in a same area, with problem of demand shift toward cheaper existing infrastructures, therefore increasing the problem of cost recovery. The incentives caused by the introduction of prices based on SMC’s are also investigated.     

A strategic model of public–private partnerships in transportation: Effect of taxes and cost structure on investment viability

We formulate a game-theoretic model of a concession agreement between a government and a private party, a concessionaire, who has to engage a set of service providers as part of the operating responsibilities. We use the model to examine the importance of a government's tax policy to induce private investments in transportation infrastructure. Our analysis brings to fore insights that are useful in the design of partnership agreements, such as the importance of early and binding government commitments to ensure stable partnerships, and thus, successful projects. Our analysis shows that these strong commitments are even more critical in situations where the success of the partnership requires participation of additional, self-interested parties, such as specialized service providers. Finally, we consider variations of the model where government preferences are explicitly captured, and where the returns from the fixed cost portion of the concessionaire's investment are exempt from taxes. We show that both variations can lead to outcomes where the concessionaire's tax burden is shifted to the service providers. This flexibility can be critical in the design of partnership agreements for (high-risk or highly specialized transportation) projects where additional incentives may be needed to induce private party participation.     

Passenger railway reform in the last 20 years - European experience reconsidered

It is about 20 years since the rail reform process in Europe began with the separation of infrastructure from operations in Sweden. This paper reviews the entire process, examining the objectives of reform, the different models adopted, and the key elements of separation of infrastructure from operations, competition both through open access and franchising and regulation and infrastructure charging. It is concluded that separation of infrastructure from operations involves costs, but is the most effective way of achieving within mode competition. Where operations do not greatly overlap and open access passenger and freight are unimportant, leasing infrastructure to passenger franchisees may be effective, but the model of vertical integration as separate subsidiaries within a holding company structure makes it difficult to ensure a level playing field for new entrants and is only effective where the vertically integrated operator remains dominant.     

Rail infrastructure charging EU-directive,Swedish concerns and theory

The first railway package is being recast by the legislative bodies of the European Union. One point of departure in this paper is how Swedish agencies treat issues concerning marginal cost based charges, financing charges and allocation of scarce capacity and it discusses these issues from a welfare point of view, partly by use of theoretical modelling. It is seen here that the Swedish infrastructure manager (the Swedish Transport Administration) so far has no method for calculation of marginal costs as a base for charging, especially for costs of scarce capacity, and that the infrastructure manager is applying or discussing various methods for allocations of scarce track capacity. The EU-recast gives no guidance on principles for calculation of charges for scarce capacity, so we recommend the Swedish Transport Administration to develop such charges. The Administration seems to ignore important externalities that should be taken into consideration from a welfare point of view, with respect both to efficient charging and to allocation of scarce capacity. The analytical modelling part of the paper aims to derive these charges in principle, taking these externalities into account. If financing charges exceeding social marginal costs are applied, the model shows how to minimise the welfare loss of these increases. It also shows that financing charges should primarily be applied to market segments that cause large external costs from the operation of the train, where its customers have low valuation of wait time and delay time, where customers of other segments have high valuations of delay and where increased profits for other operators are induced.     

低碳型集装箱港区港内道路规划方案优选

合理的港内道路路网结构及交通组织是集装箱港口作业效率提升以及节能减排的重要保证。提出利用集装箱港区生产作业智能体微观交通仿真模型模拟集装箱生产作业流程,并以集装箱港口服务水平和集卡日均碳排放成本作为指标,优选低碳型集装箱港区港内道路规划方案。应用实例表明,集装箱港区生产作业智能体微观交通仿真模型可有效模拟港内作业过程,通过对比分析不同道路规划方案下的评价指标,得到最优的港内道路规划方案,为港区道路规划与设计提供参考。     

Towards a simplified performance-linked value for money model as a reference point for bus contract payments

The burgeoning commitment to contracting the delivery of bus services through competitive tendering or negotiated performance-based contracts has been accompanied by as many contract payments schemes as there are contracts. We are now well placed to design a simplified performance-linked payment (SPLP) model that can be used as a reference point to ensure value for money, given the accumulation of experiences throughout the world which have revealed substantive common elements in contracts. Whether the payment to the operator is framed as a payment per passenger or as a payment per service kilometre, the SPLP identifies efficient subsidy outcomes that are linked to a proxy indicator of net social benefit per dollar of subsidy. We illustrate how the SPLP model can be applied to obtain the gross (subsidy) cost per passenger (or per passenger km) from measures of gross cost efficiency and network effectiveness. This model can then be used as part of a benchmarking activity to identify reference value of money prospects in respect of passengers per $ subsidy outlay by adjusting for influences not under the control of the service provider. A single framework to identify contract payments to operators, and to assess (i.e., benchmark) operator performance on critical KPIs, is provided by internalising critical key performance indicators (KPIs) in the design of the SPLP. The proposed SPLP model is sufficiently general to be independent of the procurement method (competitive tendered or negotiated, for example) and of the treatment of revenue allocation (net or gross based contracts), with the additional advantage of being able to assess value for money for government.     

Impact of regulation on the performances of long-distance transport services: A comparison of the different approaches in Sweden and Norway

Despite the many socio-economic similarities between Sweden and Norway, differences in jurisdiction, organisation, cooperation, and financing of long-distance passenger train and coach services have led to the development of four distinctively different ways of serving the markets. This paper describes how the train and coach markets have developed in the two countries, with emphasis on regulatory and industrial structure and a couple of performance variables.Looking at passenger rail, both countries separated infrastructure from operation over a decade ago. However, while Norwegian rail is characterised by an almost monopoly supplier, rail services in Sweden are partly decentralised to the responsibility of county authorities and are widely subjected to competitive tendering. The rest of the network is about to be opened up for on-the-track competition. Swedish Rail (SJ) has spent the last decades consolidating its core business (passenger rail) and sold out its other businesses. In contrast, the Norwegian state rail (NSB) has expanded its business to become a major bus operator and property owner, with extensions also into the Swedish market.The coach industry was more recently deregulated in both countries. The Swedish coach market is dominated by privately owned companies operating services to and from Stockholm. In Norway, state-owned NSB is a major coach operator on medium distance routes, and is also the largest partner of Nor-Way Bussekspress which totally dominates long-distance coach services. Further, the Norwegian coach market is characterised by cross-ownership and cooperation which has enabled an extensive route network which covers most of Norway.We find distinct differences in achievements in the two modes and in the two countries. Swedish rail services have succeeded in winning market shares and in renewing and developing both infrastructure and service levels to a greater extent than the Norwegian model. On the other hand, the Norwegian coach market seems to be more developed and efficient compared to its Swedish counterpart.The paper concludes with a discussion on the possible links between the different approaches and the performance observed, with the aim to stimulate further and more detailed research on some important issues.     

Eastern/Western European shipping companies and multimodal transport operations

The purpose of this article is to discuss the current developments in multimodal cargo flows in North European freight transports from Eastern and Western European shipping companies' point of view. Four types of options were identified for shipping companies in multimodal transport operations, namely: (i) the full service operator option, (ii) the feeder operator option in container trades, (iii) the ro-ro operator option, and (iv) the ferry operator option. Option (i) requires a global transport network together with efficient information handling capabilities. This option can be reached by a limited number of mega-carriers. The scope of investment and know-how in this option is such that Eastern European operators are unlikely to achieve this level. In (ii), fleets from (or registered in) the former socialist countries have an advantage as low cost operators, provided that the quality of the operation conforms to principals' requirements. However, the supply side in the intra-European container feeder trades seems to be quite saturated, and new market shares will be very difficult to acquire in the 1990s. In ro-ro shortsea trades the major freight transport operators are well integrated into either freight forwarder driven arrangements (Sweden, Germany), or into major shippers (Finland). As providers of port-to-port transports for road-based cargoes, ferry operators continue to play an important part in international transports. However, the major incentive (and revenue) for passenger/car ferry operations is usually derived from consumers' vacational or travelling needs. Along with the ongoing transition process and a higher level of economic stability that is hopefully achieved in these countries, mergers and acquisitions by Western partners are likely to follow.     

Port competition between Shanghai and Ningbo

The objective of this paper is to analyse the relative competitiveness of the neighbouring container ports of Shanghai and Ningbo in China and to develop a view of the likely future outcome of the competition between them. After assessing the demand for their services within what is hypothesized as a shared hinterland, current supply and future expansion plans are detailed and considered within the two ports' wider development strategies. The relative competitiveness of the two ports is then evaluated on the basis of price and quality of service, as embodied within the concept of generalized cost as incurred by customers. A critical political dimension is a necessary element of this analysis. It is concluded that continued economic development in the hinterland, central government policies on regional development and China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will all contribute to growing demand for port services. However, Ningbo will continue to gain greater market share as the result of advantages in its natural endowments (particularly depth of water), price (especially in terms of recovering the cost of capacity expansions) and quality of service improvements that are predicted to emerge as the result of currently planned enhancements to inland transport infrastructure and logistical systems.     

Port competition between Shanghai and Ningbo

The objective of this paper is to analyse the relative competitiveness of the neighbouring container ports of Shanghai and Ningbo in China and to develop a view of the likely future outcome of the competition between them. After assessing the demand for their services within what is hypothesized as a shared hinterland, current supply and future expansion plans are detailed and considered within the two ports’ wider development strategies. The relative competitiveness of the two ports is then evaluated on the basis of price and quality of service, as embodied within the concept of generalized cost as incurred by customers. A critical political dimension is a necessary element of this analysis. It is concluded that continued economic development in the hinterland, central government policies on regional development and China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will all contribute to growing demand for port services. However, Ningbo will continue to gain greater market share as the result of advantages in its natural endowments (particularly depth of water), price (especially in terms of recovering the cost of capacity expansions) and quality of service improvements that are predicted to emerge as the result of currently planned enhancements to inland transport infrastructure and logistical systems.     

A break-even model for evaluating the cost of container ships waiting times and berth unproductive times in automated quayside operations

The planning, design and development of a container terminal with optimum size and capacity and with a minimum capital cost is fundamentally dependent upon the loading and discharging operations at the quayside. The quayside function of container terminals is dependent basically on the number of berths available to service the incoming container ships. The objective of the container terminals dealing and admitting the ongoing ship calls is to provide immediate berth and loading and discharging services to the container ships with a minimum costly waiting time and a maximum efficiency. Previously terminal planners used to build extra berths to provide service. During the last two decades the terminal operators have adopted automation technologies in loading and discharging operation of the container ships as an alternative to designing extra berths. Ship owners naturally expect least waiting times for their container ships. On the other hand, it is also natural for port operators in a container terminal with costly facilities to see a high berth occupancy and productivity at the quayside. This study uses queuing theory to find a break-even point as a way of evaluating the cost of container ship waiting times and the cost of berth unproductive service times for container terminals aiming to automate their quayside operation. The analysis illustrates that automation devices installed on conventional Quayside Cranes (QSCs) significantly reduce the turnaround time of the container ships calling at the ports. It argues, however, that there should be a balance between the cost of berth unproductive service times and the cost of vessel waiting times. The study introduces a break-even point to be considered as a benchmark for calculating such a balance. The analysis in this study can be used as a decision tool for the operators of container terminals in the medium to small ports to appraise the feasibility of an investment in automation or expansion of the quayside facilities.     

质量策划在船舶修理质量管理中的应用

GB/T 19000-2008 idt IS0 9000：2005质量管理体系基础和术语,对质量策划的定义为：质量策划是质量管理的一部分,致力于制定质量目标并规定必要的运行过程和相关资源以实现质量目标.根据这一定义,我们将质量策划运用在船舶修理的质量管理实践之中,形成切实可行的管理制度,以满足船舶修理质量目标以及管理体系的要求.     

Minimizing lifetime structural costs: Optimizing for production and maintenance under service life uncertainty

Current naval shipowners are being forced to extend the service lives of their aging vessels from budgetary and political constraints. This is causing them to incur significant costs due to maintaining the structure of these older ships to keep the ships in operation. These increasing costs make it desirable to design new naval structures with their minimization in mind, as well as ensuring that such vessels are robust to changes in expected service life with respect to their total lifetime cost. However, such structures will necessarily have higher production costs, therefore, an optimization framework is presented to estimate both production and maintenance costs for a naval vessel's internal structure and develop trade-spaces between these two competing objectives in order to find designs that represent a balance of both.     

葛洲坝船闸水工建筑物运行维护管理实践

葛洲坝船闸水工建筑物的质量直接影响水利枢纽的使用寿命。葛洲坝船闸运行38年以来,严格执行国家、部颁法律法规及标准对其水工建筑物进行运行维护管理,建立科学规范的维护管理体系,加强日常巡查、仪器监测、日常维护和监测数据管理,采取船闸监测设施自动化改造、结构缝渗漏处理等工程处理措施,创新船闸检修施工方法、工艺和技术,构建船闸快速检修体系,组建专业船闸检修队伍,不断提升运行维护的管理能力和水平,从而确保葛洲坝船闸水工建筑物安全、稳定运行。