Shipping and investment incentives: a trilogy Part 2. Investment incentives for shipping

This paper concentrates on the shipping industry and considers the forms of fiscal and financial incentives which are used by different governments to promote or encourage investment in their shipping industry. The analysis reduces the various packages of investment incentives and loan arrangements to a common measurement—the net present value of the package—and uses this to draw international comparisons and rankings. The results are based on different values of rates of return in the shipping industry and under certain assumptions concerning the rate of inflation and the rate of discount. Differences in loan arrangements have also been incorporated. The particular results are valid only for the specified circumstances but the methodology is generally applicable.     

Shipping and investment incentives: a trilogy Part 3. The effectiveness of investment incentives for shipping—the UK experience 1950-1987

This paper concentrates on the determinants of investment and examines both theoretical and empirical work on the investment function. The major determinants are considered and a case study of the United Kingdom shipping industry in the period 1963-1987 is undertaken. The analysis is unable to find any real link between the value of the investment incentives packages available to the UK shipping industry and the size of the UK fleet during this period. The conclusion follows that while financial factors (e.g. favourable credit arrangements) or individual components (e.g. investment grants) of fiscal packages may influence the decision to invest, the total package has not affected the level of shipping investment in the manner expected.     

The econometric testing of investment incentives: A cointegrated approach

Thie paper re-examines the link between shipping investment and investment incentives, first explored in this journal by Marlow, and subsequently developed by mcWilliams et al. in the July-September issue. Examination of the ststistical properties of the data reveals that some of McWilliams' results may be flawed. A modified version of the Marlow model is estimated. checking for statistical and economic consistency, using cointegration, checking for statistical and economic consistency, using cointegration techniques. The estimated model resolves marlow's original challenge, but does not appear to be as robust as could be wished.     

The econometric testing of investment incentives: A cointegrated approach

Thie paper re-examines the link between shipping investment and investment incentives, first explored in this journal by Marlow, and subsequently developed by mcWilliams et al. in the July–September issue. Examination of the ststistical properties of the data reveals that some of McWilliams' results may be flawed. A modified version of the Marlow model is estimated. checking for statistical and economic consistency, using cointegration, checking for statistical and economic consistency, using cointegration techniques. The estimated model resolves marlow's original challenge, but does not appear to be as robust as could be wished.     

民营企业财务管理问题浅析

分析我国民营企业发展过程中财务管理工作方面存在的诸多问题,如财务管理体制问题、投资和筹资问题等;同时针对上述问题提出相应解决方法。     

对我国水路基础设施投融资政策的分析与调整

随着社会经济的快速发展，水路交通基础设施相对落后的状况与水路交通运输大发展需求之间的矛盾仍然存在。根据实际发展情况变化，分析研究现行水路交通基础设施投融资政策，明确政策凋整的依据和条件，并对国家相关政策提出调整建议和具体的实施措施，对于充分发挥水路交通在国民经济发展中的作用很有必要。通过凋研提出了增加国家财政投资、鼓励多渠道投资、创新融资方式和发挥地方政府投资的积极性等政策建议。     

内河航道工程财务效益探讨

以杭嘉湖航道网改造工程为实例,采用敏感性分析和概率分析的方法,分别按改扩建项目和新建项目,探讨不同收费方式下内河航道工程的财务效益。研究结果表明,运量大的长湖申线有一定的财务效益,项目自身具有生存能力,但运量小的六平申线,财务效益差,投资决策应注重其社会效益。     

试论我国集团公司财务管理体制改革

针对集团公司内存在的诸如规模效益不佳、重复投资、资金运营效率低下等问题,本文对集团公司的财务管理体制进行了深入研究,提出了构建以资金管理为中心,以财务结算中心为手段,集权为主、分权为辅的新型财务管理模式,从根本上转变财务管理理念,实施并完善相应的配套措施。     

金融危机下福建船舶企业防范风险的策略和思考

世界性金融危机对全球的船舶市场产生巨大影响，而福建船舶业也难以独善其身。如何应对金融危机，并从战略的高度提出一系列的防范对策与措施，是当前每一个船舶人都需要面对的重要课题之一。这场金融危机所造成的潜在风险可能来自船东或金融机构一方，也可能直接就来自企业本身，对此要有足够的认识；当然，危机既包含着巨大的风险，同时也孕育着莫大的机遇。如果我们在沟通信息、扩大融资渠道和苦练内功等方面有所作为，谋定而动，就一定能够让福建的船舶企业淌过险滩，再创佳绩。     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

A strategic model of public–private partnerships in transportation: Effect of taxes and cost structure on investment viability

We formulate a game-theoretic model of a concession agreement between a government and a private party, a concessionaire, who has to engage a set of service providers as part of the operating responsibilities. We use the model to examine the importance of a government's tax policy to induce private investments in transportation infrastructure. Our analysis brings to fore insights that are useful in the design of partnership agreements, such as the importance of early and binding government commitments to ensure stable partnerships, and thus, successful projects. Our analysis shows that these strong commitments are even more critical in situations where the success of the partnership requires participation of additional, self-interested parties, such as specialized service providers. Finally, we consider variations of the model where government preferences are explicitly captured, and where the returns from the fixed cost portion of the concessionaire's investment are exempt from taxes. We show that both variations can lead to outcomes where the concessionaire's tax burden is shifted to the service providers. This flexibility can be critical in the design of partnership agreements for (high-risk or highly specialized transportation) projects where additional incentives may be needed to induce private party participation.     

Maritime investment strategies with a portfolio of real options

The maritime industry operates in a dynamic global environment subject to a great number of variables. In this context, the investment challenge facing shipowners is correctly to value alternate mutually exclusive investment strategies before proceeding with confidence to commit to a project which will add the greatest value to the firm. To survive in the competitive market environment shipping companies must be flexible. Companies that rely solely on traditional discounted cash flow analysis may be underestimating the true value of their investment by not valuing any embedded real options specifically. To avoid misallocation of resources, the true value of these embedded options (strategies) should be recognised and quantified where possible for inclusion in the capital budgeting process. Using real options analysis, (ROA), as a development of the financial pricing advances of the 1970s, flexibility is valued like a financial option using non-arbitrage and added to the present value of the original strategy to derive the present value of the flexible strategy. The more uncertainty (risk) present, the greater will be the value of the real options. Similarly, the larger the shipowner's portfolio of options (strategies) from which to choose, the greater will be the valuation of the project. Real options give the shipowner the flexibility to exchange one risky income stream associated with one strategy for that of another. The analysis shows that if managers have the flexibility of more than one embedded option (in this paper, a European put associated with a replacement investment and an option on the maximum of two operating strategies, trading or chartering out) then the project will have greater value than if the there was no choice or if it was limited to one or the other strategy. Sensitivity analysis extends the analysis to demonstrate that if the volatilities of the risky income streams are highly correlated then the additional value of this flexibility will diminish.     

Quality incentives and quality outcomes in procured public transport - Case study Stockholm

Gross contracts appear to be the most common contract form for procured public transport in Sweden and elsewhere. This contract form, it has been argued, gives weak incentives for operators to deliver the desired quality level. Therefore many procuring public transport authorities amend contracts with quality incentives.This paper examines how such quality incentives influence quality outcomes with focus on cancelled departures and delays. The main findings are that the introduction of quality incentives are correlated with both increases and decreases of measured quality outcomes.We hypothesise that the results are driven by underlying cost changes for achieving desired quality objectives that exceed the possible revenues from the incentives. In interviews with the Stockholm public transport authority (SL) and some operators, two central observations surface. The first is that there are causes for quality failures that are not solely the responsibility of operators and that these are therefore not fully reached by the incentives, and the second is that the operators believe that they have exhausted what they can do under the current contracts.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Finding a balance: companies, seafarers and family life

Separation from partner and family has been found to be one of the most significant causes of stress for seafarers, with separation from the family one of the most important 'stress' factors influencing a decision to reduce planned sea service. Drawing on in-depth interviews with seafarers' partners in the UK, China and India, this paper focuses on the impact of seafaring on family life, with particular attention given to the effects of differing conditions of service and the range of company support available to seafarers and their partners. The paper concludes that the negative consequences of seafaring can be minimized by such policies as shorter trips, continuous employment (rather than employment by voyage) and opportunities for partners and families to sail. Whilst these measures may have financial costs, these can be off-set by improved retention of seafarers and the avoidance of stress-related illnesses. Indeed, at a time when there is a projected shortfall of well-trained seafarers, such steps may be sound company policy     

Finding a balance: companies,seafarers and family life

Separation from partner and family has been found to be one of the most significant causes of stress for seafarers, with separation from the family one of the most important ‘stress’ factors influencing a decision to reduce planned sea service. Drawing on in-depth interviews with seafarers' partners in the UK, China and India, this paper focuses on the impact of seafaring on family life, with particular attention given to the effects of differing conditions of service and the range of company support available to seafarers and their partners. The paper concludes that the negative consequences of seafaring can be minimized by such policies as shorter trips, continuous employment (rather than employment by voyage) and opportunities for partners and families to sail. Whilst these measures may have financial costs, these can be off-set by improved retention of seafarers and the avoidance of stress-related illnesses. Indeed, at a time when there is a projected shortfall of well-trained seafarers, such steps may be sound company policy     

Transport pricing and Public-Private Partnerships in theory: Issues and Suggestions

This chapter offers a theoretical examination of the following questions: what are the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); and how may these issues be dealt with?We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.     

工程造价全过程控制的重点及对策

对建设项目在投资决策阶段、设计阶段、发包阶段、施工阶段和竣工结算阶段中如何做好工程造价控制工作,提出应对措施,以求合理使用人力、物力和财力,取得较好投资效益。     

Barriers for adoption of energy efficiency operational measures in shipping industry

According to the Third Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Study 2014 of International Maritime Organization (IMO), the total emission in 2012 are estimated to be 949 million tonnes which is 2.7% of global CO₂ emission by total shipping and expected to increase from 2012 levels by 50–250% by 2050. Significant changes are needed to all industry by implementation of energy efficiency design and operational measures to meet existing and future global emission reduction targets. Although the fuel cost-reducing effects of some energy efficiency measures and new technologies are well established and matured, shipping companies appear reluctant to adopt them. Besides, it is observed that the stakeholders are directly or indirectly involved for implementation of energy efficiency measures in shipping industry. Therefore, the objective for this study was to identify the barriers to energy efficiency operational measures by a qualitative survey among various stakeholders from all corners of shipping industry. It has been found in the research that the barriers for implementation of all cost-free operational measures are almost the same such as lack of information of the measure, lack of awareness and competence of ship crews and operation difficulties which are in nature of information and technical barriers. But financial issue and owner’s interest are the key barriers for some other operational measures which are related to costing and need investment for implementation.     

National-flag shipping: An appraisal of policy options from a Canadian perspective

In this paper the author reviews recent developments in Canadian government policy with regard to national-flag shipping. In response to criticism from various marine interest groups that successive governments have done little to encourage the development of national-flag shipping, federal administrations have taken a more active part in the debate. This has been manifest in several reports produced under the auspices of Transport Canada, which discuss the desirability of using selective tax or fiscal incentives to promote investment in Canadian shipping. The author outlines the arguments for expanding national-flag shipping, relating these to the greater question of what effect these proposed financial measures might have on the use of capital and other resources. He concludes that selective preferential taxation may be justified by the repatriation of shipping activities now offshore and avoidance of further shifts of manpower and capital offshore.